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   Each	
  generation	
  must	
  discover	
  its	
  mission,	
  fulfill	
  it	
  or	
  betray	
  it,	
  in	
  relative	
  opacity.	
  	
  Frantz	
  Fanon,	
  The	
  Wretched	
  of	
  
the	
  Earth	
  (1961),	
  145	
  	
  
Abstract	
  	
  This	
  essay	
  explores	
  the	
  distinction	
  between	
  anticolonial	
  longing	
  and	
  postcolonial	
  becoming	
   through	
   a	
   commentary	
   of	
   Antjie	
   Krog’s	
  Begging	
   to	
   be	
   Black	
   (2009).	
  The	
  epistemology	
  and	
  ontology	
  of	
  postcolonial	
  becoming	
  is	
  the	
  central	
  concern.	
  
Begging	
   to	
   be	
   Black	
   is	
   a	
  mytho-­‐poetic	
   narrative	
   in	
  which	
   a	
  world	
   is	
   imagined	
  where	
  King	
  Moshoeshoe,	
  missionaries	
  from	
  the	
  19th	
  century,	
  Antjie	
  Krog	
  and	
  her	
  friends	
   and	
   colleagues,	
   ANC	
   cadre,	
   the	
   Deleuzian	
   philosopher	
   Paul	
   Patton,	
  Nelson	
   Mandela,	
   Archbishop	
   Desmond	
   Tutu,	
   and	
   the	
   ANC	
   Youth	
   League,	
   are	
  placed	
   in	
   the	
   same	
   narrative	
   space	
  where	
   they	
  might	
   intermingle.	
   And	
   this	
   is	
  done	
  to	
  respond	
  to	
  a	
  crisis	
  of	
  the	
  present	
  –	
  the	
  difficulties	
  South	
  Africans	
  face	
  in	
  grappling	
  with	
  the	
  legacies	
  of	
  colonialism	
  and	
  Apartheid,	
  and	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  process	
  of	
  un-­‐homing	
  and	
  re-­‐homing	
  that	
  Krog	
  feels	
  white	
  South	
  Africans	
  in	
  particular	
  need	
  to	
  think	
  more	
  deeply	
  about.	
  The	
  essay	
  compares	
  Krog’s	
  approach	
  to	
  decolonization	
  with	
  the	
  leading	
  South	
  African	
  philosopher	
  of	
  ubuntu,	
  Magobe	
  Ramose.	
   Both	
   Krog	
   and	
   Ramose	
   offer	
   the	
   epistemological	
   and	
   ontological	
  resources	
  for	
  grappling	
  with	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  past,	
  present,	
  and	
  future	
  in	
  a	
  decolonizing	
  setting.	
  The	
  essay	
  examines	
  how	
  postcolonial	
  critique	
  may	
  take	
  place	
   through	
   liminal	
   figures.	
   	
   Liminality	
   is	
   characterized	
   as	
   central	
   to	
  postcolonial	
  becoming.	
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   Fanon	
   wrote	
   these	
   lines	
   as	
   a	
   wave	
   of	
   anti-­‐colonial	
   revolution	
   and	
  transformation	
   swept	
   aside	
   the	
   erstwhile	
   imperial	
   orders	
   in	
   Asia,	
   Africa,	
   the	
  Caribbean,	
  and	
  the	
  Middle	
  East.	
  The	
  opacity	
  he	
  speaks	
  of	
  conveys	
  a	
  quieter	
  and	
  more	
   contemplative	
   message	
   than	
   that	
   of	
   the	
   fervent	
   Fanon	
   whose	
   call	
   to	
  revolutionary	
  violence	
  was	
  embraced	
  by	
  those	
  engaged	
  in	
  anti-­‐colonial	
  struggle.1	
  	
  In	
  the	
  face	
  of	
  a	
  totalizing,	
  brutal,	
  violent,	
  racist	
  colonial	
  order,	
  Fanon’s	
  aim	
  was	
  to	
  authorize	
   every	
   anti-­‐colonial	
   revolt	
   including	
   the	
   claim	
   to	
   nation	
   (Fanon,	
  1961:146).	
   Engaging	
   with	
   the	
   psychic	
   and	
   affective	
   life	
   of	
   colonizer	
   and	
  colonized,	
   he	
   gave	
   particular	
   attention	
   to	
   how	
   a	
   fragile	
   and	
   anxious	
   colonized	
  consciousness	
  could	
  assert	
  and	
  arrive	
  at	
  national	
   liberation.	
   	
  Throwing	
  out	
   the	
  old	
   order	
   through	
   national	
   liberation	
   usually	
   resulted	
   in	
   a	
   transfer	
   of	
  sovereignty.	
   But	
   postcolonial	
   sovereignty	
   often	
   replaced	
   imperial	
   sovereignty	
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with	
   a	
   suppression	
  of	
  minorities,	
   ethno-­‐national	
   chauvinism,	
  new	
  racisms,	
   and	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  ‘private	
  indirect	
  rule’	
  (Mbembe,	
  2001).	
  My	
  objective	
  here	
  is	
  not	
  to	
  add	
  yet	
  another	
  nail	
  to	
  the	
  coffin	
  of	
  colonial	
  sovereignty	
  or	
  to	
  claim	
  that	
  postcolonial	
  imperatives	
  have	
  not	
  yet	
  been	
  met	
  because	
  the	
  anticolonial	
  revolution	
  failed	
  or	
  is	
   yet	
   to	
   happen.	
   Instead,	
   it	
   is	
   to	
   signal	
   the	
   need	
   to	
  move	
   beyond	
   ‘anticolonial	
  longing’	
   towards	
  postcolonial	
  becoming	
  as	
   the	
  condition	
   for	
  grappling	
  with	
  the	
  challenges	
   of	
   divided	
   polities	
   still	
   emerging	
   from	
   colonial	
   violence,	
   and	
   social	
  and	
   economic	
   inequalities	
   that	
   remain	
   the	
   stubborn	
   legacies	
   of	
   colonialism	
  (Scott,	
  2004:	
  7).2	
  	
  	
   The	
  move	
  from	
  anticolonial	
  longing	
  to	
  postcolonial	
  becoming	
  is	
  one	
  that	
  I	
  locate	
  among	
  liminal	
  beings	
  and	
  the	
  spaces	
  they	
  occupy.	
  In	
  this	
  article	
  my	
  focus	
  will	
   be	
   on	
   the	
   ‘new’	
   South	
   Africa	
   that	
   emerged	
   following	
   the	
   juridical	
   and	
  political	
   transition	
   from	
  Apartheid	
   in	
  1994	
   (Madlingozi,	
   2007).3	
  What	
  mode	
  of	
  becoming,	
   I	
   ask,	
  might	
   secure	
   a	
   postcolonial	
   future?	
   The	
   liminal	
   figure	
   I	
   focus	
  most	
   attention	
   on	
   here	
   is	
   South	
   African	
   poet	
   and	
   writer	
   Antjie	
   Krog,	
   and	
   her	
  recent	
   book	
   Begging	
   to	
   be	
   Black	
   (2009).	
   	
   This	
   might	
   immediately	
   rile	
   some	
  readers	
  of	
  this	
  essay.	
  Why	
  focus	
  on	
  a	
  white	
  Afrikaner	
  woman	
  who	
  has	
  written	
  a	
  book	
   about	
   becoming	
   black	
   in	
   a	
   country	
  where	
   the	
   vast	
  majority	
   of	
   the	
   black	
  population	
  are	
  living	
  in	
  conditions	
  of	
  violence	
  and	
  inequality	
  that	
  hardly	
  provide	
  much	
  opportunity	
   for	
  becoming	
  otherwise?	
   	
  Such	
  a	
  question	
  does	
  not	
  do	
  much	
  justice	
   to	
   the	
  multiple	
   forms	
  of	
  black	
  becoming.	
  What	
  Krog	
   is	
   attempting	
   is	
   an	
  epistemic	
  move	
  towards	
  another	
  ontology	
  of	
  being.	
   	
  She	
  is	
  seeking	
  to	
  de-­‐centre	
  herself	
  and	
  a	
  colonizer’s	
  way	
  of	
  seeing,	
  knowing,	
  and	
  being.	
  She	
  does	
  not	
  seek	
  to	
  deny	
  or	
  hypostatize	
  difference.	
   	
  Her	
  approach	
  has	
  risks	
  and	
  contradictions.	
  My	
  objective	
  is	
  to	
  discuss	
  some	
  of	
  these.	
  	
  	
   Why	
   should	
   anyone	
   outside	
   South	
   Africa	
   care	
   about	
   this	
   discussion?	
  Becoming	
  otherwise	
  is	
  not	
  only	
  a	
  challenge	
  for	
  South	
  Africans	
  attempting	
  to	
  deal	
  with	
  350	
  years	
  of	
  colonialism,	
  and	
  50	
  years	
  of	
  Apartheid.4	
  South	
  Africa	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  place	
   for	
   Europeans	
   and	
   North	
   Americans	
   to	
   sharpen	
   their	
   good	
   consciences.	
  Apartheid,	
   despite	
   its	
   singularity,	
  was	
   a	
  metonymic	
   violence	
   through	
  which	
   to	
  decipher	
   so	
  many	
   different	
   kinds	
   of	
   violence	
   going	
   on	
   in	
   the	
  world	
   	
   (Derrida,	
  1994:	
   xv).	
   	
   The	
   inequality	
   between	
   white	
   and	
   black	
   people	
   in	
   South	
   Africa	
  reflects	
   a	
   global	
   crisis	
   of	
   wealth	
   disparity	
   and	
   the	
   failures	
   of	
   radical	
   political	
  transformation.	
  Inequality	
  in	
  South	
  Africa	
  is	
  embedded	
  in	
  every	
  urban	
  and	
  rural	
  landscape,	
   and	
   the	
   lives	
  of	
   its	
   people	
   and	
   is	
   thus	
  palpable.	
  The	
   global	
  North	
   is	
  connected	
   to	
   these	
   inequalities	
   in	
   ways	
   that	
   are	
   less	
   apparent	
   but	
   no	
   less	
  heinous.	
   There	
   is	
   also	
   a	
   problem	
   of	
   potential	
   political	
   horizons	
   that	
   South	
  Africans	
   share	
   with	
   people	
   from	
   other	
   parts	
   of	
   the	
   world.	
   	
   When	
   Chris	
   Hani,	
  leader	
  of	
   the	
  South	
  African	
  Communist	
  Party	
  and	
  chief	
  of	
  staff	
  of	
  Umkhonto	
  we	
  
Sizwe,	
   the	
   armed	
  wing	
  of	
   the	
  ANC,	
  was	
   assassinated	
   in	
  Boksburg	
  on	
  10th	
  April	
  1993,	
   and	
   quite	
   possibly	
   well	
   before	
   that,	
   a	
   paradigm	
   of	
   communism	
   and	
  socialist	
   nationalism	
   was	
   being	
   lost	
   not	
   only	
   to	
   South	
   Africa,	
   but	
   also	
   to	
   the	
  world.5	
   Democracy,	
   human	
   rights,	
   rule	
   of	
   law,	
   capitalism	
   and	
   de-­‐regulation	
   of	
  markets	
   are	
   a	
   global	
   institutional	
   consensus	
   implemented	
   in	
   South	
   Africa	
   and	
  many	
  other	
  countries.	
  They	
  form	
  a	
  structural	
  limit	
  on	
  deeper	
  political	
  and	
  socio-­‐economic	
   transformation.	
  While	
   anti-­‐capitalist	
   rebellion	
   and	
   revolt	
   is	
   urgently	
  needed,	
  so	
  many	
  alternatives	
  hinge	
  on	
  forms	
  of	
  nationalist	
  sovereignty	
  that	
  carry	
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their	
  own	
  disasters.	
  At	
   least	
  one	
  modest	
  task,	
  therefore,	
   is	
  to	
  chart	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  modes	
  of	
  becoming	
   for	
   living	
  here	
  and	
  now,	
   in	
   this	
  world	
  and	
  not	
   in	
  a	
  utopian	
  future.	
  	
   To	
   return	
   to	
  Fanon,	
   then,	
  what	
   is	
   the	
  postcolonial	
   injunction	
  or	
  mission	
  for	
  becoming	
  otherwise	
  in	
  South	
  Africa	
  today?	
  How	
  will	
  it	
  be	
  discovered,	
  fulfilled	
  or	
  betrayed?	
  Taking	
  my	
  cue	
  from	
  Fanon	
  I	
  want	
  to	
  suggest	
  that	
  the	
  South	
  African	
  poet	
  and	
  writer,	
  Anjie	
  Krog,	
  might	
  be	
  finding	
  a	
  way	
  to	
  dwell	
  in	
  the	
  opacity	
  of	
  the	
  present	
   in	
  ways	
  that	
  open,	
  however	
  tentatively,	
  some	
  pathways	
  of	
  postcolonial	
  becoming.	
  The	
  epistemology	
  and	
  ontology	
  of	
  postcolonial	
  becoming	
  is	
  the	
  crux	
  of	
  my	
  concern	
  here.	
  I	
  thus	
  compare	
  Krog’s	
  approach	
  with	
  the	
  leading	
  South	
  African	
  philosopher	
  of	
  ubuntu,	
  Magobe	
  Ramose	
  (Ramose,	
  2002;	
  2006;	
  2007).	
  Both	
  Krog	
  and	
  Ramose	
  give	
  us	
  the	
  epistemological	
  and	
  ontological	
  resources	
  for	
  grappling	
  with	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  past,	
  present,	
  and	
  future.	
  But	
  there	
  are	
  important	
  differences	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  thinkers.	
  	
  The	
  key	
  difference	
  is	
  between	
  anticolonial	
  longing	
  (Ramose’s	
  project)	
  and	
  postcolonial	
  becoming	
  (Krog’s	
  project).	
  Although	
  I	
  favor	
  Krog’s	
  approach,	
  I	
  do	
  so	
  with	
  the	
  hope	
  that	
  the	
  onto-­‐epistemology	
  for	
  its	
  fulfillment	
   might	
   be	
   found	
   in	
   Ramose’s	
   philosophical	
   writings.	
   Whether	
   Krog	
  succeeds	
  or	
  fails	
  may	
  quite	
  aptly,	
  as	
  Fanon	
  suggests,	
  remain	
  opaque.	
  	
  The	
   more	
   general	
   concern	
   of	
   the	
   article	
   is	
   with	
   what	
   questions	
   and	
  approaches	
  will	
  animate	
  postcolonial	
  becoming?	
  The	
  tension	
  here	
  is	
  between	
  a	
  past	
   that	
  resists	
  correction	
  (the	
  problem	
  of	
   justice),	
  and	
  a	
   future	
  that	
  demands	
  adjustment	
  (the	
  problem	
  of	
  invention).	
  To	
  put	
  it	
  another	
  way,	
  will	
  the	
  future	
  be	
  driven	
  by	
  an	
  adjustment	
  of	
  the	
  past	
  (recovering	
  sovereignty	
  for	
  instance),	
  or	
  by	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  new	
  missions	
  directed	
  at	
  new	
  problems	
  and	
  questions?	
  What	
   is	
  needed	
   is	
  a	
   turning	
   towards	
  a	
   future	
  but	
  always	
  with	
   the	
  spectres	
   that	
  disrupt	
  the	
   linear	
  unfolding	
  of	
   time.	
  The	
  narratives	
  of	
  past,	
  present,	
  and	
   future	
  are	
   the	
  spaces	
  where	
  movement	
  is	
  possible.	
  But	
  what	
  mission,	
  what	
  horizon,	
  drives	
  the	
  narratives	
  and	
  work	
  of	
  becoming?	
  	
  	
  I	
  am	
  not	
  a	
  South	
  African.	
  I	
  was	
  born	
  in	
  Sri	
  Lanka	
  in	
  1970.	
  I	
  became	
  a	
  Tamil	
  on	
   25th	
   July	
   1983	
   when	
   my	
   family	
   and	
   home	
   were	
   attacked	
   in	
   the	
   pogroms	
  unleashed	
   on	
   Tamils	
   in	
   Colombo,	
   and	
   throughout	
   the	
   country.	
   A	
   discussion	
   of	
  that	
  forced	
  becoming	
  is	
  for	
  another	
  time	
  and	
  place.	
  	
  But	
  it	
  is	
  an	
  experience	
  that	
  radicalized	
   me	
   against	
   any	
   essential	
   conception	
   of	
   being.	
   The	
   enforcement	
   of	
  identification	
  that	
  struck	
  my	
  otherwise	
  multiply	
  constituted	
  and	
  situated	
  body	
  in	
  July	
   1983	
   conditioned	
   my	
   close	
   interest	
   in	
   non-­‐sovereign	
   forms	
   of	
   becoming.	
  South	
  Africa	
  has	
  been	
  an	
  exemplary	
  setting	
  for	
  thinking	
  the	
  problem	
  of	
  becoming	
  in	
  the	
  face	
  of	
  colonial	
  violence	
  and	
  sharply	
  divided	
  communities.	
  Although	
  I	
  am	
  now	
   an	
   Australian	
   citizen	
   living	
   and	
   working	
   in	
   the	
   UK,	
   I	
   have	
   found	
   myself	
  regularly	
  returning	
  to	
  South	
  Africa	
  after	
  my	
  first	
  visit	
   in	
  2003.	
  Unlike	
  Sri	
  Lanka	
  with	
   its	
   now	
   triumphant	
   Sinhalese	
   majority,	
   or	
   Australia	
   with	
   its	
   belated	
  apologies	
   for	
   genocidal	
   acts	
   and	
   tightly	
   circumscribed	
  native	
   title	
   rights,	
   South	
  Africa	
   is	
   driven	
   to	
   confront	
   a	
   stark	
   reality.	
   	
   The	
   descendants	
   of	
   the	
   waves	
   of	
  colonial	
   settlers	
   remain	
   a	
   minority.	
   And	
   despite	
   their	
   relative	
   affluence	
  preserved	
   in	
   the	
  political	
  compromise	
  that	
  ended	
  Apartheid	
   in	
  1994,	
   there	
   is	
  a	
  strong	
  sense	
  that	
  more	
  radical	
  transformation	
  is	
  urgently	
  needed.	
  In	
  this	
  article	
  I	
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explore	
   some	
   of	
   the	
   more	
   imaginative	
   and	
   inventive	
   approaches	
   to	
   becoming	
  postcolonial	
  emerging	
  in	
  South	
  Africa.	
  	
   *	
  	
   Antjie	
  Krog	
  is	
  a	
  celebrated	
  South	
  African	
  poet	
  who	
  was	
  born	
  in	
  Kroonstad	
  and	
  grew	
  up	
  on	
  a	
   farm	
   in	
   the	
  Free	
  State.	
  While	
  her	
  poetry	
  has	
  been	
  translated	
  into	
   many	
   languages,	
   she	
   gained	
   significant	
   international	
   prominence	
   among	
  critical	
   theorists	
   following	
   her	
   work	
   with	
   a	
   team	
   that	
   covered	
   the	
   Truth	
   and	
  Reconciliation	
  Commission	
  hearings	
   for	
  SABC	
  Radio	
   in	
  1995.	
  She	
   later	
  brought	
  her	
   formidable	
   literary	
   skills	
   to	
   bear	
   on	
   transmitting	
   the	
   power	
   of	
   the	
  testimonies	
  at	
  the	
  TRC	
  to	
  a	
  wider	
  international	
  audience	
  through	
  her	
  book	
  The	
  
Country	
  of	
  my	
  Skull	
   (1998).	
  She	
  conveyed	
  something	
  of	
  peoples’	
   trauma	
  in	
  that	
  book,	
   but	
   importantly	
   also	
   the	
   limits	
   of	
   addressing	
   this	
   through	
   testimonies	
  before	
   commissions,	
   strained	
   apologies,	
   or	
   seemingly	
   cathartic	
   spectacles	
   of	
  forgiveness.	
  This	
  was	
   followed	
  by	
  A	
  Change	
  of	
  Tongue	
   (2003)	
  which	
  combined	
  fact	
   and	
   fiction	
   to	
   explore	
   how	
  South	
  Africans	
  were	
   living	
  with	
   the	
   legacies	
   of	
  Apartheid,	
   its	
   traumas,	
   but	
   also	
   the	
   beauty	
   and	
   anxiety	
   in	
   what	
   has	
   slowly	
  emerged	
   over	
   time	
   –	
   the	
   Afrikaans	
   language,	
   food,	
   dramatic	
   landscapes	
   with	
  layers	
   of	
   agriculture,	
   and	
   mixed	
   and	
   divided	
   communities.	
   	
   The	
   challenge	
   of	
  becoming	
  different	
  after	
  Apartheid	
   is	
   captured	
   in	
   the	
   title	
  A	
  Change	
  of	
  Tongue.	
  Language	
   is	
   one	
   contested	
   and	
   complex	
   site	
   of	
   becoming.	
   The	
   Constitution	
  guarantees	
  eleven	
  languages,	
  but	
  English	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  ascendance.	
  In	
  some	
  cases	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  English	
  only	
  serves	
  to	
  sustain	
  white	
  enclaves,	
  crowding	
  out	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  coloured	
  community	
  who	
  speak	
  Afrikaans	
  as	
  their	
  first	
  language.	
  The	
  rise	
  of	
  English	
  over	
  Afrikaans,	
  partly	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  globalization,	
  is	
  also	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  few	
  South	
  Africans	
  have	
  bothered	
   to	
   learn	
  Sepedi,	
   Sesotho,	
   Set-­‐swana,	
   siSwati,	
  Tshivenda,	
   Xitsonga,	
   IsiNdebele,	
   IsiXhosa,	
   or	
   IsiZulu,	
   across	
   the	
   boundaries	
   of	
  their	
  respective	
  communities.	
  Beyond	
  language,	
  what	
  Krog	
  has	
  been	
  concerned	
  with	
  is	
  the	
  question	
  of	
  what	
  it	
  means	
  to	
  become	
  different	
  across	
  racialized	
  lines	
  of	
   community	
   when	
   continued	
   co-­‐existence	
   demands	
   transformation?	
  Addressing	
  that	
  question	
  is	
  at	
  the	
  heart	
  of	
  Krog’s	
  latest	
  book,	
  Begging	
  to	
  be	
  Black	
  (2009).	
  	
  	
  It	
   is	
   of	
   course	
   significant	
   that	
   the	
   title	
   to	
   Krog’s	
   book	
   about	
   ‘becoming	
  black’	
   carries	
   the	
   somewhat	
   shocking	
   title	
  of	
   ‘Begging	
   to	
  be	
  Black’.	
   	
  Again,	
   one	
  can	
  imagine	
  the	
  reactions:	
  a	
  white	
  person	
  can	
  never	
  know	
  what	
   it	
  means	
  to	
  be	
  black;	
   how	
   can	
   this	
   privileged	
  white	
  woman	
   pretend	
   to	
   cast	
   herself	
   in	
   such	
   a	
  ‘needy’	
  light	
  by	
  using	
  ‘begging’	
  in	
  her	
  title;	
  is	
  she	
  appropriating	
  an	
  experience	
  of	
  oppression	
  that	
  white	
  people	
  can	
  never	
  know	
  about;	
  or	
  is	
  it	
  a	
  willed	
  submission	
  from	
  a	
  place	
  of	
  plenty,	
  or	
   ‘identity	
  suicide’?	
   I	
   read	
   the	
   title	
  more	
  generously	
  as	
  invoking	
   a	
   passivity	
   and	
   necessity	
   that	
   moves	
   away	
   from	
   a	
   strong	
   sense	
   of	
  subjectivity	
   or	
   judgment.	
   ‘Begging’	
   opens	
   a	
   relation	
   of	
   gifting.	
   But	
   as	
   I	
   suggest	
  below,	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  an	
  identity	
  that	
  is	
  being	
  sought.	
  Rather	
  it	
  is	
  an	
  attempt	
  to	
  share	
  an	
  onto-­‐epistemology	
  of	
  becoming.	
  Begging	
   to	
  be	
  Black	
   explores	
   the	
  possibility	
  of	
  white	
  people	
  becoming	
  otherwise	
  in	
  post-­‐apartheid	
  South	
  Africa.	
  The	
  project	
  of	
  ‘becoming	
   black’	
   eschews	
   any	
   essentialist	
   meaning	
   to	
   being	
   ‘black/white’,	
  colonial/postcolonial.	
   Those	
  who	
   hold	
   to	
   a	
   notion	
   of	
   race	
   as	
   a	
   substance	
  with	
  presence	
  in	
  the	
  world	
  will	
  tend	
  to	
  misunderstand	
  this	
  book.	
  	
  This	
  is	
  not	
  to	
  deny	
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that	
   racial	
   logics	
   produce	
   real	
   and	
   actual	
   consequences	
   in	
   the	
   lived	
   reality	
   of	
  those	
  with	
  racialized	
  bodies.	
  Nor	
  is	
  there	
  a	
  suggestion	
  that	
  a	
  movement	
  towards	
  black	
  can	
  be	
  (or	
  ought	
  to	
  be)	
  replicated	
  with	
  a	
  move	
  away	
  from	
  black.	
  We	
  should	
  by	
  now	
  be	
  well	
  past	
  the	
  time	
  when	
  race	
   is	
  treated	
  as	
  having	
  such	
  a	
  substantial	
  essence.	
   This	
   is	
   not	
   an	
   easy	
   thing	
   for	
   liberals	
   who	
   have	
   built	
   their	
   careers	
   in	
  Identity	
  Inc.	
  	
  
Begging	
  to	
  be	
  Black	
  is	
  a	
  work	
  of	
  literary	
  non-­‐fiction.	
  Krog	
  weaves	
  several	
  narrative	
   strands	
   together:	
   the	
  murder	
   of	
   a	
   gang	
   leader	
   shot	
   by	
   ANC	
   cadre	
   in	
  1992,	
   her	
   own	
   involvement	
   in	
   the	
   case	
   after	
   the	
   killers	
   hid	
   incriminating	
  evidence	
  and	
  the	
  weapon	
  in	
  her	
  home;	
  an	
  account	
  of	
  the	
  Boer	
  and	
  English	
  land	
  grabs	
   of	
   the	
   19th	
   century	
   in	
   what	
   is	
   now	
   Lesotho	
   told	
   through	
   the	
   encounter	
  between	
  the	
  Besotho	
  King	
  Moshoeshoe	
  and	
  French	
  missionaries;	
  Krog’s	
  visit	
  to	
  the	
  Wissenschaftskolleg	
   in	
  Berlin;	
  more	
   intimate	
  reflections	
  contained	
   in	
   letters	
  to	
  her	
  mother	
  while	
  in	
  Berlin;	
  and	
  Krog’s	
  visit	
  to	
  Lesotho.	
  Each	
  of	
  these	
  strands	
  is	
  placed	
  in	
  conversation	
  with	
  the	
  other.	
  Krog	
  is	
  experimenting	
  with	
  the	
  genre	
  of	
  literary	
  non-­‐fiction	
  where	
  past	
  and	
  present,	
  inner	
  thoughts	
  and	
  outer	
  events	
  are	
  folded	
   into	
   each	
   other.	
   While	
   each	
   strand	
   of	
   the	
   book	
   might	
   be	
   treated	
  individually	
   as	
   the	
   recounting	
   of	
   actual	
   events,	
   their	
   being	
   placed	
   beside	
   each	
  other	
   constitutes	
   a	
   mytho-­‐poetic	
   narrative.	
   The	
   reader	
   is	
   drawn	
   into	
   that	
  powerful	
   imaginary	
   space	
  where	
   characters	
   and	
   events	
   across	
   time	
   and	
   space	
  speak	
  to	
  each	
  other.	
   	
  Begging	
  to	
  be	
  Black	
   is	
  a	
  mytho-­‐poetic	
  narrative	
  because	
  a	
  world	
  is	
  imagined	
  where	
  King	
  Moshoeshoe,	
  missionaries	
  from	
  the	
  19th	
  century,	
  Antjie	
   Krog	
   and	
   her	
   friends	
   and	
   colleagues,	
   ANC	
   cadre,	
   the	
   Deleuzian	
  philosopher	
   Paul	
   Patton,	
   Krog’s	
   husband	
   J.,	
   Nelson	
   Mandela,	
   Archbishop	
  Desmond	
   Tutu,	
   and	
   the	
   ANC	
   Youth	
   League,	
   are	
   placed	
   in	
   the	
   same	
   narrative	
  space	
  where	
  they	
  might	
  intermingle.	
  And	
  this	
  is	
  done	
  to	
  respond	
  to	
  a	
  crisis	
  of	
  the	
  present	
   –	
   the	
   difficulties	
   South	
   Africans	
   face	
   in	
   grappling	
   with	
   the	
   legacies	
   of	
  colonialism	
  and	
  Apartheid,	
  and	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  process	
  of	
  un-­‐homing	
  and	
  re-­‐homing	
  that	
  Krog	
  feels	
  white	
  South	
  Africans	
  in	
  particular	
  need	
  to	
  think	
  more	
  deeply	
   about.	
   Although	
   facts	
   are	
   recounted,	
   the	
   form	
   of	
   the	
   text	
   produces	
   a	
  powerful	
   as	
   if.	
   The	
   wisdom	
   of	
   this	
   illusion,	
   this	
   as	
   if,	
   is	
   that	
   it	
   composes	
   a	
  conversation	
   across	
   time	
   and	
   space	
   (Part	
   One	
   of	
   the	
   book	
   is	
   ‘The	
   Long	
  Conversation:	
   First	
   Perceptions	
   and	
   Un-­‐Hearings’),	
   and	
   then	
   creates	
   the	
  conditions	
   for	
   drawing	
   out	
   insights	
   and	
   examining	
   errors	
   and	
   failures	
   of	
  perception	
   (Part	
   Two:	
   ‘Understandings,	
   Assumed	
   Understandings,	
   and	
   Non-­‐Understandings’).	
  In	
  the	
  final	
  Part	
  (‘The	
  Long	
  Conversation:	
  Whose	
  Context’)	
  she	
  returns	
  to	
  key	
  moral	
  and	
  political	
  dilemmas	
  raised	
   in	
  the	
  narrative	
  to	
   find	
  that	
  her	
  own	
  line	
  of	
  thinking	
  needs	
  to	
  be	
  altered	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  face	
  up	
  to	
  a	
  philosophical	
  and	
  existential	
  un-­‐homing.	
  	
  Each	
  character,	
  each	
  position	
  and	
  perspective,	
  is	
  put	
  into	
  question	
  in	
  their	
  inter-­‐mingling	
  with	
  others.	
  This	
  approach	
  to	
  history	
  takes	
  seriously	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
   it	
   is	
  narrative	
   that	
  constitutes	
   the	
  relation	
  between	
  past,	
  present,	
  and	
  future	
  (Scott,	
  2005:	
  7).	
  	
  
Begging	
  to	
  be	
  Black	
  begins	
  with	
  the	
  killing	
  of	
  Wheetie,	
  leader	
  of	
  the	
  Three	
  Million	
   Gang,	
   by	
   ANC	
   cadre	
   in	
   the	
   Town	
   of	
   Kroonstad	
   on	
   25th	
   February	
   1992.	
  Two	
  possible	
  reasons	
  for	
  killing	
  Wheetie	
  emerge.	
  Wheetie	
  had	
  set	
  up	
  an	
  Inkatha	
  branch	
  in	
  a	
  township	
  with	
  the	
  support	
  of	
  the	
  police	
  and	
  was	
  spreading	
  violence	
  in	
  Kroonstad.	
  He	
  was	
  thus	
  eliminated	
  by	
  his	
  political	
  enemies.	
  	
  However,	
  one	
  of	
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the	
  members	
   of	
   the	
  ANC	
   youth	
   group	
   involved	
   in	
   the	
   killing,	
   the	
   Young	
   Lions,	
  had	
   also	
   been	
   caught	
   in	
   bed	
   with	
   Wheetie’s	
   wife.	
   	
   Wheetie	
   had	
   threatened	
  revenge.	
   So	
   was	
   his	
   killing	
   personal	
   or	
   political?	
   When	
   Krog	
   is	
   drawn	
   into	
  assisting	
  the	
  killers	
  to	
  escape,	
  and	
  later	
  finds	
  that	
  the	
  pistol	
  and	
  balaclava	
  used	
  in	
  the	
  killing	
  was	
  hidden	
  in	
  her	
  garden,	
  and	
  a	
  T-­‐shirt	
  worn	
  by	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  accused	
  is	
  left	
  in	
  her	
  possession,	
  she	
  faces	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  moral	
  and	
  political	
  dilemmas.	
  Here	
  the	
   context	
   of	
   the	
   killing	
   becomes	
   relevant.	
   In	
   what	
   way,	
   and	
   to	
   what	
   extent,	
  should	
  it	
  have	
  a	
  bearing	
  on	
  whether	
  she	
  will	
  report	
  the	
  matter	
  to	
  the	
  police,	
  or	
  give	
  evidence	
  for	
  the	
  State	
  in	
  the	
  prosecution	
  of	
  the	
  killers?	
  	
  By	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  Wheetie’s	
  killing	
  Nelsen	
  Mandela	
  had	
  been	
  released	
  from	
  prison	
  and	
  the	
  ANC	
  had	
  been	
  unbanned.	
  	
  F.W.	
  de	
  Klerk	
  was	
  negotiating	
  with	
  the	
  ANC	
   and	
  Mandela.	
   However,	
   the	
   Apartheid	
   state	
   and	
   the	
   security	
   police	
   were	
  fermenting	
   and	
  orchestrating	
   violence	
   in	
   the	
   townships	
  by	
   exploiting	
   rivalries,	
  setting	
  Inkatha	
  members	
  against	
  the	
  ANC.	
  	
  As	
  Krog	
  puts	
  it	
  within	
  her	
  narrative:	
  ‘The	
   TRC	
   also	
   heard	
   that	
   more	
   South	
   Africans	
   were	
   killed	
   between	
   1990	
   and	
  1994	
  than	
  in	
  the	
  twenty	
  years	
  of	
  Total	
  Onslaught	
  before’.	
  ‘Is	
  this	
  possible?’,	
  Krog	
  wonders,	
   and	
   phones	
   one	
   of	
   the	
   TRC	
   lawyers	
   to	
   find	
   out:	
   ‘It’s	
   true’,	
   she	
   says.	
  ‘Remember	
  that	
  the	
  majority	
  of	
  amnesty	
  applicants	
  are	
  black	
  and	
  many	
  many	
  of	
  them	
   formed	
  part	
  of	
   these	
   roped-­‐in	
  groups,	
   especially	
   through	
   Inkatha’.	
   (Krog,	
  2009:	
  257)	
  	
   Krog’s	
   initial	
   dilemma	
   about	
  what	
   to	
   do	
  when	
   she	
   finds	
   out	
   that	
   she	
   is	
  going	
   to	
   be	
   implicated	
   in	
   assisting	
   Wheetie’s	
   killers	
   to	
   escape	
   is	
   set	
   within	
   a	
  paradigm	
  of	
   the	
  struggle	
  against	
  Apartheid.	
   If	
   the	
  killing	
   is	
  part	
  of	
   the	
  struggle	
  then	
  is	
  what	
  Krog	
  did	
  in	
  taking	
  the	
  incriminating	
  evidence	
  to	
  the	
  police	
  justified?	
  Is	
  the	
  killing	
  about	
  sex,	
  revenge,	
  or	
  politics?	
  What	
  difference	
  should	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  possibilities	
  make	
  to	
  the	
  dilemmas	
  of	
  a	
  white	
  woman	
  at	
  a	
  time	
  when	
  South	
  Africa	
  was	
  in	
  the	
  throws	
  of	
  a	
  violent	
  transition	
  to	
  democratic	
  rule?	
  Krog	
  was	
  not	
  given	
  much	
   of	
   a	
   choice	
   when	
   she	
   was	
   unwittingly	
   drawn	
   into	
   driving	
   the	
   killers	
   to	
  Maokeng.	
  She	
  is	
  a	
  white	
  woman,	
  a	
  member	
  of	
  the	
  ANC,	
  working	
  in	
  solidarity	
  with	
  the	
  black	
  and	
  coloured	
  communities	
   to	
  bring	
  down	
  the	
  Apartheid	
  state.	
   In	
   that	
  context	
  what	
   she	
  has	
   to	
  offer	
   the	
   struggle	
   are	
  her	
  middle	
   class	
   advantages	
   –	
   a	
  car,	
   a	
   fax	
   machine,	
   her	
   profile	
   as	
   a	
   celebrated	
   poet.	
   For	
   Krog	
   ‘[i]t’s	
   a	
   moral	
  decision,	
  but	
  the	
  thing	
  is,	
  to	
  what	
  extent	
  can	
  you	
  make	
  a	
  moral	
  decision	
  within	
  an	
  immoral	
  context’	
  (Krog,	
  2009,	
  13).	
  	
  In	
   one	
   sense	
   the	
   killing	
   of	
  Wheetie	
   involved	
   the	
  murder	
   of	
   a	
  murderer.	
  She	
  believes	
  murder	
  is	
  wrong	
  –	
  respect	
  for	
  life	
  should	
  be	
  a	
  basic	
  principle.	
  Is	
  she	
  frightened,	
  the	
  police	
  ask	
  her,	
  as	
  they	
  search	
  her	
  home	
  soon	
  after	
  the	
  killing?	
  	
  She	
  refutes	
  this	
  vehemently:	
   ‘If	
   I	
   look	
  frightened	
  to	
  you,	
   it	
   is	
  because	
  I’m	
  upset	
  that	
  you	
  and	
  the	
  politicians	
  have	
  made	
  sure	
  that	
  an	
  honourable	
  position	
  is	
  no	
  longer	
  possible	
  for	
  an	
  ordinary	
  person	
  in	
  this	
  country’	
  (Krog,	
  2009:	
  39).	
  Krog	
  grapples	
  with	
   the	
   conundrum	
   of	
   respect	
   for	
   life	
   in	
   a	
   society	
   that	
   has	
   never	
   formed	
   ‘a	
  coherent	
  enough	
  whole’	
   to	
  decide	
  on	
  which	
  principles	
   it	
   agrees	
  on	
   (2009:	
  46).	
  	
  But	
  can	
  this	
  be	
  the	
  basis	
  for	
  deciding	
  if	
  a	
  death,	
  a	
  killing,	
  is	
  legitimate?	
  	
  Would	
  the	
  killing	
  be	
  any	
  more	
  legitimate	
  if	
  there	
  was	
  a	
  communal	
  consensus	
  about	
  it?	
  	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  well-­‐worn	
  decision	
  on	
  the	
  political	
  –	
  the	
  decision	
  between	
  friend	
  and	
  foe	
  that	
  Carl	
  Schmitt	
  wrote	
  about	
  (Schmitt,	
  1996).	
  Is	
  loyalty	
  to	
  the	
  cause,	
  supporting	
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the	
  struggle,	
  enough	
  reason	
  to	
  support	
  a	
  killing	
  or	
  killers?	
  Does	
  this	
  simply	
  shift	
  the	
  moral	
  responsibilities	
  of	
  the	
  individual?	
  Put	
  differently,	
  Krog	
  is	
  fighting	
  for	
  a	
  moral	
  space	
  in	
  conditions	
  where	
  most	
  of	
  the	
  population,	
  including	
  herself,	
  don’t	
  live	
  within	
  a	
  common,	
  stable	
  moral	
  environment.	
   	
  She	
  seems	
  to	
  conclude	
  that	
  a	
  ‘honourable	
   position’	
   is	
   not	
   possible	
   where	
   death-­‐dealing	
   and	
   violence	
   is	
  justified	
   in	
   the	
   name	
   of	
   the	
   ‘struggle’.	
   	
   Will	
   such	
   instrumental	
   reasoning	
   only	
  prepare	
  the	
  ground	
  for	
  a	
  sacrificial	
  union	
  –	
  a	
  Republic	
  of	
  friends	
  and	
  enemies?	
  	
  Krog	
   was	
   ultimately	
   drawn	
   into	
   the	
   case	
   as	
   a	
   State’s	
   witness	
   in	
   the	
  prosecution	
  of	
  the	
  killers.	
  She	
  took	
  the	
  red	
  T-­‐Shirt	
  that	
  implicated	
  the	
  killers	
  to	
  the	
   police.	
   This	
   was	
   by	
   no	
   means	
   the	
   end	
   of	
   the	
   violence	
   in	
   Kroonstad.	
   The	
  accused	
   are	
   convicted	
   and	
   receive	
   prison	
   sentences	
   but	
   later	
   receive	
   amnesty	
  through	
  the	
  TRC.	
  She	
  has	
  faced	
  a	
  terrible	
  choice	
  –	
  risk	
  becoming	
  an	
  accessory	
  to	
  murder	
   by	
   trying	
   to	
   cover	
   up	
   a	
  murder	
   that	
  went	
   against	
   all	
   the	
   principles	
   of	
  valuing	
   life	
   that	
  she	
  believed	
  the	
  ANC	
  was	
   fighting	
   for,	
  or	
  work	
  with	
   the	
  police	
  who	
  were	
  fermenting	
  and	
  facilitating	
  the	
  violence	
  between	
  Inkatha	
  and	
  the	
  ANC.	
  But	
   the	
   question	
   remains	
   -­‐	
   is	
   the	
   murder	
   of	
   a	
   murderer	
   any	
   less	
   a	
   murder	
  because	
  the	
  killers	
  get	
  amnesty?	
  Krog	
  made	
  her	
  decision	
  as	
  a	
  middle	
  class	
  white	
  woman	
  who	
  believed	
  murder	
  was	
  wrong	
  –	
  though	
  the	
  decision	
  is	
  not	
  specific	
  to	
  her	
   class,	
   race,	
   or	
   gender.	
  Whether	
  murderers	
   remain	
   ‘murderers’	
   after	
   being	
  granted	
  amnesty	
  is	
  a	
  question	
  that	
  continues	
  to	
  haunt	
  South	
  Africa.6	
  	
   	
  It	
  is	
  from	
  this	
  setting,	
  with	
  these	
  dilemmas,	
  that	
  she	
  turns	
  to	
  consider	
  how	
  to	
  understand	
  her	
  choices	
  as	
  the	
  majority	
  of	
  South	
  Africans	
  might	
  do.	
  	
   Krog	
   poses	
   difficult	
   questions.	
   Is	
   morality	
   or	
   ethics	
   relative	
   to	
   one’s	
  conditions	
  of	
  existence?	
  Is	
  there	
  a	
  distinction	
  between	
  black	
  and	
  white	
  morality	
  in	
  South	
  Africa	
  given	
  the	
  very	
  different	
  conditions	
  in	
  which	
  people	
  live?	
  	
  How	
  can	
  white	
   people	
   even	
   think	
   this	
   when	
   Krog	
   knows	
   that	
   during	
   Apartheid	
   other	
  white	
  mothers	
  like	
  her	
  were	
  making	
  torture	
  bags	
  on	
  their	
  sewing	
  machines	
  for	
  use	
  by	
  the	
  police	
  (2009:	
  69)?	
  She	
  yearns	
  to	
  be	
  in	
  another	
  ethos	
  or	
  life,	
  ‘unpoluted	
  by	
  human’	
   (2009:	
  69).	
  To	
  be	
  human,	
   then,	
   is	
  precisely	
   to	
  confront	
   these	
  moral	
  and	
  ethical	
  dilemmas	
  in	
  the	
  face	
  of	
  what	
  humans	
  unleash	
  on	
  other	
  humans	
  in	
  the	
  name	
  of	
  humanity.	
  	
  Having	
  told	
  herself	
  that	
  she	
  would	
  not	
  draw	
  lines	
  (not	
  make	
  ethical	
  judgments),	
  that	
  white	
  people	
  should	
  live	
  300	
  years	
  under	
  other	
  people’s	
  terms,	
  she	
  draws	
  a	
  line:	
  ‘I	
  can’t	
  exist	
  in	
  a	
  space	
  where	
  certain	
  things	
  don’t	
  count,	
  old	
  fashioned	
  things	
  like	
  respect	
  for	
  life,	
  respect	
  for	
  each	
  other	
  as	
  human	
  beings,	
  honesty	
   and	
   something	
   that	
   perhaps	
   I’ll	
   call	
   beauty	
   …	
   something	
  uncontaminated	
   by	
   people	
   –	
   like	
   trees,	
   grass,	
   birds’	
   (2009:	
   69).	
   There	
   is	
   a	
  yearning	
   here	
   for	
   ‘truth’	
   in	
   conditions	
   where	
   colonialism	
   and	
   apartheid	
   have	
  destroyed	
  the	
  conditions	
  for	
  an	
  ethical	
  consensus.	
  There	
  is	
  also	
  a	
  powerful	
  ethic	
  of	
  putting	
  the	
  ‘world’	
  as	
  conceived	
  by	
  ‘humans’	
  into	
  question.	
  There	
  is	
  a	
  distrust	
  of	
   human	
   values,	
   human	
   ethics,	
   and	
   human	
   truths	
   -­‐	
   a	
   search	
   for	
   something	
  uncontaminated	
  by	
  people.	
  	
  It	
  is	
  a	
  going	
  beyond	
  human	
  that	
  conditions	
  the	
  onto-­‐epistemic	
  transformation	
  I	
  believe	
  she	
  would	
  like	
  all	
  South	
  Africans	
  to	
  undergo,	
  especially	
  white	
  South	
  Africans.	
   	
  It	
  is	
  a	
  going	
  beyond	
  human	
  that	
  sets	
  the	
  scene	
  for	
  the	
  ‘becoming	
  minor’	
  that	
  she	
  develops	
  later	
  in	
  the	
  book.	
  My	
  sense	
  is	
  that	
  in	
  this	
  moment	
  of	
  marking	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  go	
  beyond	
  human	
  she	
  is	
  putting	
  herself	
  in	
  a	
  
liminal	
  space	
  from	
  which	
  to	
  think	
  postcolonial	
  alternatives.	
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The	
  liminal	
  space	
  between	
  a	
  colonial	
  order	
  and	
  a	
  postcolonial	
  future	
  can	
  only	
   be	
   grasped	
   through	
   the	
   beings	
   that	
   occupy	
   it.	
   It	
   cannot	
   be	
   opened	
   by	
  legislation,	
  or	
  inaugurated	
  in	
  a	
  spectacular	
  declaration,	
  even	
  though	
  law	
  and	
  its	
  origins	
  might	
   be	
   born	
   of	
   this	
   liminality.	
   	
   Liminality	
   is	
   a	
   lived	
   condition	
  which	
  presents	
   itself	
   in	
   the	
  everyday	
  existence	
  of	
  ordinary	
  and	
  extraordinary	
  people.	
  Krog	
  occupies	
   this	
  space	
  herself	
  when	
  she	
  confronts	
   tough	
  choices,	
  dwelling	
   in	
  the	
   in-­‐between	
   space	
   of	
   dishonorable	
   safety	
   (reporting	
   to	
   the	
   police)	
   and	
  dangerous	
   possibility	
   (going	
   beyond	
   the	
   humanism	
   that	
   has	
   previously	
  authorized	
   critical	
   judgment).	
   But	
   more	
   importantly,	
   she	
   draws	
   out	
   this	
  liminality	
   through	
   two	
   other	
   central	
   figures	
   who	
   populate	
   her	
   book	
   –	
   King	
  Moshoeshoe	
   of	
   the	
   Besotho,	
   and	
   Petrus,	
   a	
   character	
   in	
   J.M	
   Coetzee’s	
   novel	
  
Disgrace	
   (1999).	
  Moshoeshoe’s	
   story	
   is	
  drawn	
   from	
  the	
  past	
   to	
  circulate	
   in	
   the	
  present,	
   while	
   Petrus	
   is	
   here	
   now	
   (albeit	
   in	
   literature),	
   but	
   his	
   story	
   and	
   the	
  conditions	
  for	
  its	
  telling	
  are	
  yet	
  to	
  come	
  (I	
  return	
  to	
  discuss	
  Petrus	
  below).	
  	
   Moshoeshoe	
   was	
   a	
   Bosotho	
   King	
   who	
   united	
   numerous	
   tribes	
   to	
  withstand	
   the	
   onslaught	
   of	
   Boer	
   and	
   English	
   settlement,	
   as	
  well	
   as	
   the	
   killing	
  sprees	
   of	
   Shaka,	
   Manthatise,	
   and	
  Mzilikazi.	
   	
   He	
   enters	
   the	
   records	
   of	
   western	
  history	
   in	
   June	
   1833	
   when	
   Eugène	
   Casalis,	
   a	
   young	
   missionary	
   of	
   the	
   Paris	
  Evangelical	
  Missionary	
  Society,	
  arrives	
  in	
  his	
  kingdom.	
  The	
  diplomatic	
  strategies	
  and	
  techniques	
  of	
  government	
  Moshoeshoe	
  developed	
  to	
  unite	
  his	
  people,	
  and	
  to	
  grapple	
   with	
   Boer	
   and	
   English	
   land	
   grabs	
   disclose	
   flexibility	
   and	
   openness.	
  Moshoeshoe’s	
   struggle	
   was	
   to	
   understand	
   and	
   inhabit	
   the	
   terrain	
   of	
   shifting	
  sovereignties	
   –	
   to	
   remain	
   true	
   to	
   his	
   own	
   ancestral	
   spirits	
   and	
   customs	
  while	
  preparing	
   himself	
   and	
   his	
   people	
   for	
   the	
   colonial	
   onslaught.	
   Moshoeshoe	
  occupied	
  and	
  negotiated	
  a	
  liminal	
  space.	
  	
  	
  By	
   juxtaposing	
   the	
   stories	
   of	
   Moshoeshoe’s	
   encounter	
   with	
   the	
  missionaries	
   and	
   colonizers	
   with	
   her	
   own	
   encounter	
   with	
   post-­‐apartheid	
  transition,	
  Krog	
  confronts	
  the	
  dilemma	
  of	
  finding	
  a	
  new	
  sense	
  of	
  being	
  in	
  a	
  place	
  that	
  never	
  was	
  home.	
  This	
  is	
  a	
  relatively	
  unique	
  approach	
  where	
  the	
  descendant	
  of	
  the	
  erstwhile	
  colonizer	
  un-­‐homes	
  herself	
  in	
  the	
  new	
  dispensation	
  rather	
  than	
  retreating	
  to	
  the	
  safety	
  and	
  security	
  of	
  the	
  European	
  metropolis,	
  or	
  disavowing	
  the	
  morality,	
  ethics,	
  and	
  abilities	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  rulers.	
  Canadian,	
  U.S,	
  and	
  Australian	
  settler-­‐descendants	
  can	
  experience	
  and	
  learn	
  much	
  from	
  this	
  enterprise	
  of	
  being	
  un-­‐homed,	
  of	
  becoming-­‐minority.	
  	
  	
  As	
  Krog	
  puts	
  it:	
  	
  ‘I	
  want	
  to	
  be	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  country	
  I	
  was	
  born	
  in.	
  I	
  need	
  to	
  know	
  whether	
  it	
  is	
  possible	
  for	
  somebody	
  like	
  me	
  to	
  become	
  like	
  the	
  majority,	
  to	
  become	
  “blacker?”	
  and	
   live	
  as	
  a	
   full	
   and	
  at-­‐ease	
  component	
  of	
   the	
  South	
  African	
  psyche’	
  (Krog,	
  2009:	
  93).	
  	
  The	
   conditions	
   for	
   this	
   need	
   not	
   be	
   a	
   choice	
   between	
   African	
   or	
   Western	
  philosophy.	
   	
  Krog	
   sees	
   it	
   rather	
  as	
   a	
  mingling	
  or	
   entanglement	
  of	
   roots	
   (2009:	
  95).	
  However,	
  philosophies	
  are	
  not	
  so	
  easily	
  deployed	
  or	
  readily	
  set	
  aside.	
  It	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  register	
  of	
  stories	
  recovered,	
  recounted,	
  and	
  imagined	
  that	
  the	
  challenge	
  of	
  making	
  a	
  shift	
  is	
  enunciated.	
  It	
  is	
  a	
  strategy	
  of	
  writing	
  and	
  living	
  that	
  will	
  disturb	
  those	
  who	
  live	
  and	
  work	
  in	
  the	
  shade	
  and	
  shadow	
  of	
  weighty	
  traditions	
  such	
  as	
  historiography,	
  philosophy,	
  and	
   law.	
  Such	
  readers	
  will	
  want	
   to	
  dismiss	
  Krog	
  as	
  nostalgic	
   and	
   moralizing,	
   but	
   hopefully	
   with	
   the	
   niggling	
   suspicion	
   that	
   their	
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regular	
   authorities	
   are	
   hardly	
   up	
   to	
   the	
   task	
   of	
   the	
   challenges	
   posed	
   in	
   a	
  postcolonial	
  setting.	
  	
  	
   Krog	
   moves	
   between	
   the	
   story	
   of	
   Moshoeshoe,	
   whose	
   conversion	
   to	
  Christianity	
  was	
   the	
  much	
   sought-­‐after	
   prize	
   of	
   successive	
  missionaries	
   in	
   the	
  19th	
  century,	
  and	
  her	
  own	
  personal	
  dilemma	
  of	
  being	
  un-­‐homed	
  in	
  South	
  Africa.	
  Though	
  she	
  does	
  not	
  explicitly	
  make	
  the	
  connection,	
  Moshoeshoe	
  and	
  his	
  people,	
  and	
  Krog	
  and	
  her	
  people,	
  confront	
  the	
  dilemma	
  of	
  living	
  with	
  an	
  Other	
  in	
  power.	
  Though	
  Moshoeshoe	
  never	
  converted	
  to	
  Christianity,	
  he	
  encouraged	
  his	
  people	
  to	
   do	
   so,	
   and	
   took	
   advantage	
   of	
   the	
   education	
   about	
   Western	
   values	
   and	
  practices	
   that	
   the	
   missionaries	
   brought	
   with	
   them.	
   Krog	
   folds	
   the	
   story	
   of	
  Moshoeshoe	
  with	
  that	
  of	
  her	
  own	
  ambivalent	
  support	
  for	
  ANC	
  cadre	
  in	
  troubled	
  and	
  violent	
  times.	
  	
  How	
  is	
  one	
  to	
  understand	
  and	
  figure	
  the	
  postcolonial	
  present	
  when	
  one	
  wants	
   to	
   appreciate	
   both	
  Wagner	
   and	
  Moshoeshoe,	
   the	
   freedoms	
  of	
  the	
   Berlin	
   academy,	
   and	
   the	
   mountains	
   of	
   Lesotho?	
   Becoming	
   minority,	
   in	
   a	
  Deleuzian	
   sense,	
   is	
   marked	
   in	
   both	
   Moshoeshoe’s	
   and	
   Krog’s	
   individual	
   fates.	
  Christianity,	
  colonialism,	
  liberalism,	
  and	
  ubuntu	
  –	
  each	
  secures	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  what	
  one	
   might	
   become.	
   But	
   they	
   also	
   constitute	
   the	
   ground	
   from	
   which	
   Krog	
   is	
  becoming	
   otherwise.	
   I	
   shall	
   turn,	
   then,	
   to	
   the	
   problem	
   of	
   becoming-­‐minority,	
  becoming	
  black,	
  as	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  the	
  emergence	
  of	
  a	
  critical	
  being	
  capable	
  of	
  challenging	
  both	
  African	
  and	
  Western	
  philosophical	
  and	
  political	
  paradigms.	
  	
   	
  Being-­‐becoming	
   is	
   an	
   epistemic	
   and	
  ontological	
   problem	
  at	
   the	
  heart	
   of	
  decolonization	
   and	
   transformative	
   politics.	
   Krog	
   has	
   responded	
   to	
   the	
   urgent	
  need	
   to	
   transform	
   ways	
   of	
   being	
   beyond	
   the	
   juridical	
   and	
   institutional	
  transformations	
   by	
   elaborating	
   what	
   it	
   would	
   mean	
   for	
   an	
   Afrikaner	
   woman	
  such	
  as	
  herself	
  to	
  ‘become	
  black’	
  in	
  multiple	
  senses.	
  Although	
  she	
  makes	
  much	
  of	
  ‘interconnectedness’	
   in	
   Begging	
   to	
   be	
   Black,	
   there	
   are	
   very	
   few	
   explicit	
  references	
   to	
  ubuntu.	
   	
  And	
  despite	
  her	
  disavowal	
  of	
  European	
  philosophy,	
  and	
  being	
   conscious	
   of	
   having	
   a	
   white,	
   male	
   philosopher	
   as	
   her	
   primary	
  philosophical	
   interlocutor	
   in	
   the	
   book,	
   she	
   relies	
   very	
   heavily	
   on	
   a	
   Deleuzian	
  theory	
   of	
   becoming.	
   It	
   is	
   thus	
   apt	
   to	
   provide	
   some	
   suggestions	
   on	
   ways	
   of	
  directly	
  engaging	
  ubuntu	
  philosophy,	
  and	
  the	
  implications	
  of	
  this	
  for	
  anticolonial	
  struggle	
  and	
  postcolonial	
  thinking.	
  	
   	
  
*	
  
	
  	
   In	
  Conscripts	
  of	
  Modernity:	
  The	
  Tragedy	
  of	
  Colonial	
  Enlightenment	
  (2004),	
  David	
  Scott	
   focuses	
  on	
  the	
  narrative	
   form	
  in	
  histories	
  of	
  anticolonial	
  struggle	
  –	
  especially	
  C.L.R.	
  James’s	
  treatment	
  of	
  the	
  Haitian	
  Revolution	
  of	
  1791-­‐1804	
  in	
  his	
  magisterial	
   work,	
   The	
   Black	
   Jacobins	
   (1938).	
   Scott	
   makes	
   many	
   incisive	
  observations	
  –	
  a	
  key	
  one	
  being	
  that	
  narratives	
  of	
  the	
  past	
  are	
  often	
  told	
  with	
  the	
  discontent	
  of	
  the	
  present	
  in	
  mind	
  (Scott,	
  2004:	
  22).	
  James’s	
  account	
  of	
  Toussaint	
  L'Ouverture’s	
   heroic	
   and	
   ultimately	
   tragic	
   struggle	
   against	
   French	
   imperialism	
  and	
   slavery	
   was	
   told	
   with	
   mid-­‐twentieth	
   century	
   decolonization,	
   and	
   anti-­‐imperial	
  nationalism,	
  as	
  the	
  near	
  horizon.	
  The	
  Black	
  Jacobins	
  was	
  thus	
  a	
  work	
  of	
  anticolonial	
   longing.	
   	
   	
   	
   Scott’s	
  point	
  of	
  departure	
   is	
   that	
  we	
   should	
  move	
  away	
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from	
   anticolonial	
   longing	
   and	
   examine	
   the	
   relationship	
   between	
   past,	
   present,	
  and	
  future,	
  as	
  historical	
  conjunctures	
  constituted	
  by	
  different	
  “problem	
  spaces”	
  (Scott:	
   2004:	
   4).	
   	
   The	
   conceptual-­‐ideological	
   problem	
   space	
   of	
   the	
   anticolonial	
  struggle	
   is	
   one	
   that	
   is	
   concerned	
   with	
   sovereignty	
   and	
   national	
   liberation.	
   I	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  tentatively	
  read	
  Ramose’s	
  philosophy	
  of	
  ubuntu	
  as	
  caught	
  between	
  this	
  anticolonial	
   longing	
   for	
   sovereignty	
   (as	
  his	
   conceptual-­‐ideological	
  problem	
  space),	
   and	
   a	
   postcolonial	
   potential	
   that	
   his	
   own	
   account	
   of	
   the	
   philosophy	
   of	
  ubuntu	
   conveys.	
   It	
   is	
   this	
   liminal	
   space	
   between	
   anticolonial	
   longing	
   for	
   the	
  recovery	
  of	
  sovereignty,	
  and	
  a	
  postcolonial	
  longing	
  for	
  becoming	
  otherwise	
  that	
  critique	
   opens.	
   Critique	
   is	
   this	
   opening	
   of	
   a	
   liminal	
   space	
   –	
   a	
   ‘conceptual-­‐ideological	
   problem	
   space’	
   that	
   both	
   Krog	
   and	
   Ramose	
   occupy	
   but	
   in	
   very	
  different	
  ways.	
  	
   Magobe	
  Ramose	
  begins	
  his	
  essay	
  ‘In	
  Memoriam:	
  Sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  “New”	
  South	
  Africa’	
  with	
  a	
  prayer	
  (Ramose,	
  2007).	
  For	
  Ramose,	
  speaking	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  South	
  Africa	
  is	
  a	
  requiem	
  mass	
  –	
  a	
  gesture	
  that	
  marks	
  a	
  death.	
  He	
  asserts	
  the	
  need	
   to	
   resurrect	
   a	
   sovereignty	
   that	
   has	
   been	
   buried,	
   displaced,	
   and	
   mis-­‐recognised.	
   	
   Ramose	
   refuses	
   to	
   allow	
   the	
   ‘lost	
   sovereignty’	
   of	
   all	
   peoples	
  conquered	
  in	
  the	
  ‘unjust	
  wars	
  of	
  colonialism’	
  to	
  remain	
  a	
  memory.	
  Recovery	
  and	
  restoration	
   are	
   claimed	
   as	
   the	
   twin	
   exigencies	
   of	
   justice	
   and	
   as	
   the	
   ‘necessary	
  means	
  to	
  the	
  construction	
  of	
  peace	
  in	
  South	
  Africa’	
  (2007:	
  311).	
  The	
  process	
  of	
  de-­‐colonisation,	
   in	
   Ramose’s	
   view,	
   is	
   not	
   yet	
   concluded,	
   and	
   certainly	
  was	
   not	
  achieved	
  through	
  the	
  elimination	
  of	
  Apartheid	
  and	
  the	
  guarantee	
  of	
  civil	
   rights	
  since	
  April	
  1994	
  (2007,	
  319).	
  While	
  those	
  who	
  pushed	
  a	
  compromise	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  1990s	
   argued	
   that	
   they	
  were	
   averting	
   a	
   civil	
  war,	
  Ramose’s	
   claim	
   is	
   that	
   since	
  colonization	
  South	
  Africa	
  has	
  been	
  ‘practically	
  in	
  a	
  state	
  of	
  war’	
  (2007:	
  320).	
  In	
  his	
   view	
   it	
   was	
   gullible	
   and	
   misleading	
   to	
   think	
   that	
   apartheid	
   was	
   the	
  fundamental	
   problem.	
   	
   This	
   is	
   why	
   freedom	
  was	
   reduced	
   to	
   the	
   guarantee	
   of	
  fundamental	
   rights	
   (2007:	
   320).	
   The	
   morality	
   and	
   political	
   legitimacy	
   of	
   the	
  colonial	
   ‘right	
   of	
   conquest’	
   was	
   left	
   untouched	
   by	
   the	
   post-­‐1994	
   dispensation.	
  	
  Ramose	
  thus	
  challenges	
  the	
  reasoning	
  that	
  asserted,	
   from	
  the	
  Freedom	
  Charter	
  onwards,	
   that	
   ‘South	
   Africa	
   belonged	
   to	
   all	
   who	
   lived	
   in	
   it’.	
   	
   We	
   might	
   then	
  conclude	
   that	
   for	
   Ramose	
   decolonisation	
   involves	
   ‘becoming	
   sovereign’	
   or	
   a	
  longing	
  for	
  true	
  national	
  liberation.	
  	
   A	
  post-­‐conquest	
  South	
  Africa,	
  Ramose	
  argues,	
  must	
  attend	
  to	
   the	
   failure	
  to	
  recognise	
  that	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  indigenous	
  communities	
  has	
  been	
  deprived	
  through	
   an	
   illegitimate	
   war	
   and	
   usurpation.	
   Abiding	
   by	
   community	
   in	
   African	
  culture	
   –	
   the	
   ‘interconnectedness’	
   that	
  Krog	
   refers	
   to	
   -­‐	
   requires	
   that	
   the	
   three	
  dimensions	
  of	
  the	
  living,	
  the	
  living	
  dead,	
  and	
  the	
  yet	
  to	
  be	
  born	
  are	
  taken	
  to	
  be	
  the	
   critical	
   ethical	
   concern.	
   Thus	
   the	
   survival	
   of	
   customary	
   kingship,	
   and	
   the	
  memory	
  of	
  the	
  heroes	
  and	
  heroines	
  who	
  fought	
  against	
  colonialism	
  requires	
  that	
  parity	
  –	
  horizontality	
  -­‐	
  be	
  restored	
  between	
  the	
  ‘indigenous	
  conquered	
  peoples’	
  and	
   that	
   of	
   the	
   successors	
   in	
   title	
   to	
   the	
   questionable	
   ‘right	
   of	
   conquest’.	
   	
   For	
  Ramose,	
   the	
   ‘reaffirmation’	
   of	
   such	
   ‘horizontal	
   reasoning’	
   is	
   a	
   necessary	
  condition	
   for	
   a	
   genuinely	
   autochthonous	
   constitution	
   (2007:	
   326).	
   Here	
   the	
  challenge	
   to	
   Krog’s	
   approach	
   to	
   becoming	
   black	
   is	
   a	
   stark	
   one.	
   It	
   says:	
   ‘if	
   you	
  want	
   to	
   establish	
   genuine	
   parity	
   between	
   yourself	
   as	
   colonizer	
   and	
   the	
  indigenous	
   population,	
   then	
   return	
   sovereignty	
   to	
   the	
   colonized’.	
   The	
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institutional	
  expression	
  of	
  this	
  would	
  be	
  Parliamentary	
  sovereignty	
  rather	
  than	
  the	
  constitutional	
  supremacy	
  that	
  South	
  Africa	
  adopted	
  in	
  1994.	
  	
  For	
   Ramose	
   the	
   denial	
   of	
   parity	
   and	
   ‘authentic	
   liberation’	
   took	
   at	
   least	
  two	
  forms:	
  the	
  subordinate	
  status	
  accorded	
  to	
  Indigenous,	
  Bantu,	
  or	
  customary	
  law	
   in	
   the	
   Constitution	
   of	
   the	
   Republic	
   of	
   South	
   Africa	
   1996,	
   and	
   the	
   racial	
  ideology	
   that	
   converted	
   parliamentary	
   supremacy	
   to	
   constitutional	
   supremacy	
  in	
  the	
  transition	
  to	
  a	
  post-­‐apartheid	
  legal	
  order.	
  	
  For	
  Ramose:	
  Ubuntu	
   …	
   represents	
   the	
   epistemological	
   paradigm	
   that	
   informs	
   the	
  cultural	
   practices,	
   including	
   the	
   law,	
   of	
   the	
   Bantu-­‐speaking	
   peoples.	
  Excluding	
   it	
   from	
   the	
   constitution	
   is	
   tantamount	
   to	
   denying	
   the	
   Bantu-­‐speaking	
  peoples	
  a	
  place	
  in	
  the	
  constitutional	
  dispensation	
  of	
  the	
  country.	
  	
  The	
  current	
  Constitution	
  is,	
  therefore	
  not	
  the	
  mirror	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  ideas	
  and	
  institutions	
   of	
   the	
   indigenous	
   conquered	
   peoples	
   of	
   South	
   Africa.	
   	
   It	
  follows	
  then	
  that	
  a	
  truly	
  South	
  African	
  Constitution	
  is	
  yet	
  to	
  be	
  born.	
  	
  On	
  this	
   reasoning,	
   Act	
   108	
   of	
   1996	
   [the	
   Constitution],	
   has,	
   perhaps	
  inadvertently,	
  set	
  the	
  stage	
  for	
  the	
  struggle	
  for	
  a	
  new	
  constitutional	
  order	
  in	
  South	
  Africa.	
  (Ramose,	
  2006,	
  366)	
  	
  Examining	
   the	
   move	
   to	
   constitutional	
   supremacy	
   ushered	
   in	
   by	
   the	
   new	
  Constitution	
  of	
  1996,	
  Ramose	
  asks	
  why	
   the	
   turn	
   to	
   ‘colour-­‐blind’	
  majority	
   rule	
  engendered	
  fear	
  of	
  a	
  black	
  constituency.	
  	
  The	
  reason	
  behind	
  the	
  conversion	
  from	
  parliamentary	
   to	
   constitutional	
   supremacy,	
  despite	
   the	
  principle	
  of	
  anti-­‐racism	
  in	
  the	
  constitution,	
  is	
  ‘racialist	
  thinking’:	
  ‘The	
  fact	
  that	
  the	
  conqueror	
  considered	
  the	
   black	
  majority	
   as	
   a	
   race,	
   coming	
   into	
   the	
   constitutional	
   process,	
  was	
   itself	
  racialist	
  thinking’	
  (Ramose,	
  2006,	
  367).	
  There	
  was	
  a	
  fear	
  that	
  the	
  putative	
  ‘black	
  race’	
  would	
  have	
  unanimity	
  on	
  all	
  matters	
  and	
  thus	
  threaten	
  all	
  ‘other’	
  interests	
  if	
   they	
   were	
   granted	
   legislative	
   or	
   Parliamentary	
   supremacy.	
   	
   Rather	
   than	
  signaling	
  the	
  return	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  to	
  the	
  colonised	
  population,	
  the	
  terms	
  of	
  the	
  transition	
  from	
  apartheid	
  to	
  post-­‐apartheid	
  is	
  viewed	
  by	
  Ramose	
  as	
  yet	
  another	
  inscription	
   of	
   a	
   colonial	
   racial	
   logic.	
   	
   Parliamentary	
   sovereignty	
   –	
   and	
   the	
  consequent	
   threat	
   of	
   majoritarianism	
   –	
   was	
   dealt	
   with	
   by	
   the	
   introduction	
   of	
  constitutional	
   supremacy.	
  Equality	
  and	
  civil	
   rights	
  would	
  be	
  guaranteed	
  by	
   the	
  constitution	
   –	
   as	
   would	
   the	
   ill-­‐gotten	
   gains	
   of	
   several	
   centuries	
   of	
   colonial	
  violence	
  and	
  usurpation.	
   	
  For	
  some	
  this	
  compromises	
  opened	
  a	
  sacrificial	
   logic	
  that	
  marks	
  the	
  new	
  constitutional	
  dispensation.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   The	
  case	
  that	
  epitomizes	
  the	
  post-­‐apartheid	
  order	
  of	
  sacrifice	
   is	
  Azapo	
  v	
  
The	
   President	
   where	
   the	
   families	
   of	
   victims	
   of	
   the	
   Apartheid	
   state’s	
   violence,	
  including	
  the	
   family	
  of	
  Steve	
  Biko,	
  challenged	
  the	
  constitutionality	
  of	
   the	
  Truth	
  and	
  Reconciliation	
  Commission’s	
  capacity	
  to	
  grant	
  amnesty	
  for	
  political	
  crimes.7	
  Sacrifice	
  was	
  at	
  the	
  heart	
  of	
  the	
  court’s	
  denial	
  of	
  the	
  families’	
  challenge,	
  and	
  a	
  key	
  feature	
  of	
  democratic	
  transition.	
  Why	
  should	
  the	
  state	
  avoid	
  responsibility	
  from	
  delictual	
  claims	
  for	
  the	
  actions	
  of	
  its	
  agents	
  as	
  the	
  applicants	
  in	
  AZAPO	
  claimed?	
  According	
   to	
   the	
   court	
   the	
   state	
   can	
   either	
   compensate	
   the	
   families	
   of	
   those	
  killed,	
  and	
  the	
  victims	
  of	
  torture	
  and	
  other	
  violations	
  of	
  human	
  rights,	
  or	
  state-­‐funds	
  can	
  be	
  directed	
  towards	
  the	
  social	
  and	
  economic	
  well-­‐being	
  of	
  the	
   living,	
  and	
  of	
   future	
  generations.	
   	
  According	
   to	
   the	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
   in	
  AZAPO,	
   the	
  negotiators	
  who	
  brought	
  into	
  being	
  the	
  Constitution:	
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could	
   have	
   chosen	
   to	
   saddle	
   the	
   state	
  with	
   liability	
   for	
   claims	
  made	
   by	
  insurance	
   companies	
   which	
   had	
   compensated	
   institutions	
   for	
   delictual	
  acts	
  performed	
  by	
  the	
  servants	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  and	
  to	
  that	
  extent	
  again	
  divert	
  funds	
  otherwise	
  desperately	
  needed	
  to	
  provide	
  food	
  for	
  the	
  hungry,	
  roofs	
  for	
   the	
   homeless	
   and	
   black	
   boards	
   and	
   desks	
   for	
   those	
   struggling	
   to	
  obtain	
  admission	
  to	
  desperately	
  overcrowded	
  schools.	
  They	
  were	
  entitled	
  to	
   permit	
   the	
   claims	
   of	
   such	
   school	
   children	
   and	
   the	
   poor	
   and	
   the	
  homeless	
  to	
  be	
  preferred	
  (AZAPO:	
  para	
  44).	
  The	
  new	
  democratic	
  order,	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  Epilogue	
  to	
  the	
  interim	
  Constitution,	
  would	
   be	
   a	
   ‘reconciliation	
   between	
   the	
   people	
   of	
   South	
   Africa	
   and	
   the	
  reconstruction	
   of	
   society’.	
   It	
   is	
   worth	
   paying	
   attention	
   to	
   this	
   account	
   of	
  reconciliation.	
  	
  This	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  reconciliation	
  between	
  previously	
  conflicted	
  polities,	
  colonizer	
   and	
   colonized,	
   or	
   between	
   the	
   beneficiaries	
   of	
   apartheid	
   and	
   the	
  disenfranchised	
   of	
   that	
   system.	
   It	
   is	
   not	
   reconciliation	
   of	
   a	
   fractured	
   society	
  coming	
   together	
   to	
   form	
   a	
   unified	
   whole.	
   It	
   is	
   not	
   a	
   restoration	
   of	
   a	
   lost	
  sovereignty.	
   It	
   is	
   precisely	
   a	
   sacrificial	
   reconciliation	
   –	
   a	
   case	
   of	
   becoming	
  reconciled	
  to	
  what	
  will	
  be	
  forgone	
  when	
  amnesty	
  is	
  granted	
  for	
  political	
  crimes,	
  when	
   property	
   rights	
   are	
   guaranteed	
   despite	
   the	
   unjust	
   conditions	
   of	
  accumulation,	
   when	
   redistribution	
   will	
   be	
   balanced	
   with	
   social	
   and	
   economic	
  stability.	
  	
  And	
  so	
  reconciliation	
  must	
  be	
  understood	
  through	
  its	
  verb	
  –	
  to	
  become	
  
reconciled	
  to	
  a	
  particular	
  liberal	
  constitutional	
  project.	
   	
  It	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  reconciliation	
  of	
   the	
   law	
  of	
   the	
  conqueror	
  and	
  conquered,	
  or	
  of	
   their	
   respective	
  and	
  multiple	
  philosophical	
  traditions.	
   	
  Indeed,	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  ubuntu	
  philosophy	
  is	
  such	
  that	
  it	
  might	
  even	
  be	
  said,	
  as	
  Ramose	
  has	
  argued,	
  that	
  the	
  ‘struggle	
  for	
  reason’	
  in	
  Africa	
  remains.	
  	
  If	
  reconciliation	
  is	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  restoration	
  of	
  sociality,	
  then	
  we	
  must	
  still	
  ask,	
  what	
  is	
  being	
  restored?	
  	
  What	
  is	
  this	
  sociality?	
  
	
  
	
   Krog’s	
  intervention	
  in	
  Begging	
  to	
  be	
  Black	
  must	
  be	
  read	
  in	
  this	
  contested	
  setting	
  where	
  embracing	
  ‘interconnectedness’,	
  ubuntu,	
  or	
  being-­‐becoming	
  black	
  is	
   articulated	
   in	
   terms	
   of	
   recovering	
   sovereignty	
   as	
   a	
   mode	
   of	
   establishing	
  political	
   and	
   epistemic	
   parity.	
   	
   There	
   is	
   an	
   anticolonial	
   longing	
   in	
   Ramose’s	
  thinking	
  that	
  is	
  tied	
  to	
  concrete	
  demands	
  about	
  democracy,	
  customary	
  law,	
  and	
  parliamentary	
   sovereignty.	
   Here	
   the	
   distinction	
   that	
   Scott	
   draws	
   between	
  anticolonial	
  longing	
  and	
  postcolonial	
  becoming	
  is	
  a	
  useful	
  one.	
  I	
  want	
  to	
  suggest	
  that	
  becoming	
  postcolonial	
  cannot	
  hinge	
  on	
   the	
  recovery	
  of	
  a	
   ‘lost	
  sovereignty’	
  Nor	
   can	
   it	
   be	
   achieved	
   by	
   replacing	
   imperial	
   sovereignty	
   with	
   indigenous	
  sovereignty.	
   	
   I	
   am	
   interested	
   in	
   the	
   fragmentation	
  of	
   the	
   sovereign	
   ‘I’	
   or	
  unity.	
  The	
   sovereign	
   being	
   (imperial,	
   national,	
   corporate,	
   or	
   indigenous)	
   whose	
  command,	
   sanction,	
   and	
   legitimacy	
   asserts	
   a	
   global	
   presence	
   needs	
   urgent	
  undoing	
  wherever	
  it	
  is	
  found.	
  My	
  sense	
  is	
  that	
  both	
  Ramose’s	
  and	
  Krog’s	
  thinking	
  contain	
   the	
   resources	
   for	
   postcolonial	
   becoming.	
   In	
   the	
   following	
   section	
   I	
  elaborate	
  this.	
  	
   *	
  
	
   What	
   does	
   it	
   mean	
   to	
   ‘become	
   black’	
   in	
   a	
   terrain	
   where	
   an	
   ‘original	
  sovereignty’,	
  as	
  Ramose	
  claims,	
  is	
  still	
  in	
  contention?	
  	
  In	
  Krog’s	
  work	
  ‘becoming	
  black’	
  is	
  a	
  mode	
  of	
  contending	
  with	
  being	
  colonial,	
  being	
  white,	
  being	
  Afrikaner.	
  It	
  adopts	
  the	
  Deleuzian	
  orientation	
  of	
  ‘lines	
  of	
  flight’	
  where	
  a	
  discrete	
  subjective	
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agent	
   is	
   undone	
   by	
   a	
   being	
   whose	
   becoming	
   is	
   minoritarian.	
   This	
   process	
   of	
  becoming	
   is	
   signified	
   by	
   ‘becoming	
  minor’	
   –	
   and	
   by	
   extension	
   here,	
   ‘becoming	
  black’.	
  
	
  	
   The	
  discussion	
  of	
  Deleuzian	
  lines	
  of	
   flight	
  takes	
  place	
  between	
  Krog	
  and	
  the	
  Australian	
  philosopher,	
  Paul	
  Patton,	
  while	
  both	
  are	
  visiting	
  at	
   the	
   Institute	
  for	
  Advanced	
  Studies	
  in	
  Berlin.	
  Patton	
  is	
  a	
  translator	
  of	
  some	
  of	
  Deleuze’s	
  major	
  works,	
  and	
  has	
  also	
  written	
  an	
  essay	
  on	
  Coetzee’s	
  Disgrace	
  where	
  he	
  discusses	
  the	
   arc	
   of	
   transformation	
   of	
   characters	
   like	
  David	
   Lurie	
   in	
  Deleuzian	
   terms	
   as	
  becoming-­‐animal	
   or	
   becoming-­‐woman	
   (Patton,	
   2006).	
   Krog	
   sees	
   writing	
   as	
   a	
  process	
   of	
   ‘becoming	
   towards’	
   what	
   she	
   is	
   trying	
   to	
   understand,	
   and	
   Patton	
  explains	
  that	
  this	
  is	
  akin	
  to	
  what	
  Deleuze	
  means	
  by	
  a	
  ‘line	
  of	
  flight’	
  (Krog,	
  2009,	
  92).	
  	
  In	
  a	
  line	
  of	
  flight:	
  	
  [o]ne	
  moves	
  from	
  an	
  established	
  known	
  identity	
  by	
  transforming	
  oneself.	
  But	
  transformation	
  always	
  moves	
  in	
  a	
  particular	
  direction	
  and	
  writing	
  is	
  often	
  the	
  best	
  way	
  to	
  trace	
  these	
  directions.	
  Expressed	
  in	
  different	
  words:	
  the	
  aim	
  of	
  good	
  writing	
  is	
  to	
  carry	
  life	
  to	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  non-­‐personal	
  power’	
  (2009:	
  92).	
  	
  Liminality,	
  exposure	
  at	
   the	
  margins,	
  being	
   in-­‐between	
  –	
  all	
   these	
  terms	
  explain	
  the	
  kind	
  of	
  understanding	
  that	
  Krog	
  is	
  trying	
  to	
  reach	
  by	
  exploring	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
   ‘becoming	
  black’.	
  She	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  she	
  is	
  neither	
  seeking	
  an	
  essential	
  identity	
  nor	
   a	
   difference.	
   	
   What	
   she	
   seeks	
   is	
   a	
   framework	
   of	
   understanding	
   -­‐	
  acknowledging	
   what	
   she	
   perceives	
   as	
   a	
   shift	
   from	
   western	
   and	
   European	
  frameworks	
  after	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  Apartheid.	
  	
  Examples	
  she	
  offers	
  to	
  characterize	
  this	
  shift	
   is	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
   Robert	
   Mugabe	
   is	
   ‘read’	
   differently	
   by	
   the	
   South	
   African	
  government	
   and	
   Zimbabweans	
   themselves	
   when	
   compared	
   with	
   western	
  reactions	
  (2009:	
  93).	
  	
   Krog	
  might	
  be	
  too	
  hasty	
  in	
  even	
  claiming	
  that	
  such	
  a	
  shift	
  of	
  frameworks	
  of	
   understanding	
   has	
   taken	
   place.	
   That	
   of	
   course	
   is	
   Ramose’s	
   point.	
   The	
  Constitution	
  and	
  many	
  of	
  South	
  Africa’s	
  institutions	
  continue	
  to	
  be	
  informed	
  by	
  liberal	
  values	
  and	
  ideologies.	
  	
  And	
  Robert	
  Mugabe	
  is	
  hardly	
  far	
  from	
  framing	
  his	
  own	
  actions	
  with	
  direct	
   reference	
   to	
   the	
  West	
   and	
   its	
   leaders	
   as	
   the	
   erstwhile	
  masters	
  with	
  whom	
  he	
  is	
  engaged	
  in	
  a	
  ‘heroic’	
  dialectical	
  struggle;	
  a	
  struggle	
  for	
  which	
  his	
   ‘people’	
  are	
  paying	
  the	
  highest	
  price.	
  But	
  the	
  example	
  of	
  reactions	
  to	
  Mugabe	
  might	
   be	
   obsolete	
   for	
   other	
   reasons.	
   The	
   process	
   of	
   becoming	
  world-­‐wide,	
   of	
   globalization	
   or	
   what	
   Jean-­‐Luc	
   Nancy	
   has	
   called	
   ‘mondialisation’,	
  undermines	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  a	
  discreet	
  or	
  delimited	
  ‘sense’	
  of	
  the	
  world	
  (Nancy,	
  1997;	
  2007).	
  	
  When	
  systems	
  of	
  economic	
  valuing	
  and	
  exchange	
  are	
  world-­‐wide,	
  what	
   scope	
   is	
   there	
   for	
   ethical	
   and	
   political	
   values	
   to	
   maintain	
   a	
   discreet,	
  localized	
  quality?	
  Krog	
   is	
   attempting	
   to	
  open	
  an	
  understanding	
  of	
  what	
   resists	
  these	
  processes	
  of	
  globalization.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   Is	
  it	
  the	
  case	
  that	
  Krog	
  is	
  seeking	
  a	
  sort	
  of	
  communal	
  completeness	
  to	
  be	
  shared	
  with	
  all	
  South	
  Africans	
  that	
  is	
  distinct	
  from	
  Euro-­‐American	
  conceptions?	
  Or	
  is	
  it	
  another	
  instance	
  of	
  the	
  colonizer	
  being	
  convinced	
  that	
  the	
  colonized	
  are	
  utterly	
  different,	
  and	
  thus	
  subtly	
  keeping	
  ingrained	
  racism	
  alive?	
  She	
  responds	
  to	
  this	
   latter	
   provocation	
   by	
   Patton	
  with	
   the	
   following:	
   ‘I	
   want	
   to	
   be	
   part	
   of	
   the	
  country	
  I	
  was	
  born	
   in.	
   I	
  need	
  to	
  know	
  whether	
   it	
   is	
  possible	
   for	
  somebody	
   like	
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me	
   to	
  become	
   like	
   the	
  majority,	
   to	
  become	
  “blacker”?	
  and	
   live	
  as	
  a	
   full	
   and	
  at-­‐ease	
   component	
   of	
   the	
   South	
   African	
   psyche’	
   (Krog,	
   2009:	
   93)	
   Krog	
   wants	
   to	
  move	
  towards	
  ‘blackness’	
  as	
  black	
  South	
  Africans	
  understand	
  it	
  (2009:	
  94).	
  She	
  is	
   seeking	
   to	
   understand	
   and	
   live	
   within	
   an	
   African	
   paradigm,	
   and	
   is	
   not	
  necessarily	
  interested	
  in	
  ‘African	
  philosophy	
  versus	
  western	
  philosophy’.	
  	
  She	
  is	
  not	
  seeking	
  an	
  ‘entanglement’	
  or	
   ‘mingling’	
  but	
  a	
   ‘synapse’	
  –	
  inquiring	
  into	
  how	
  ‘one	
  root	
  can	
  become	
  or	
  link	
  to	
  another’	
  (2009:	
  95).	
  
	
  	
   Deleuzean	
  philosophy	
  forms	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  Krog	
  and	
  Patton’s	
  discussions	
  of	
   these	
   questions	
   –	
   and	
   so	
   it	
   is	
   worth	
   quoting	
   the	
   gist	
   of	
   Deleuze’s	
   idea	
   of	
  becoming	
  as	
  it	
  is	
  reproduced	
  by	
  Krog:	
  	
  ‘plants	
  and	
  animals,	
   inside	
  and	
  outside,	
  and	
  even	
  organic	
  and	
   inorganic,	
  cannot	
  really	
  be	
  told	
  apart.	
  All	
  these	
  things	
  are	
  themselves,	
  yet	
  on	
  another	
  level	
   they	
   are	
   transforming	
   towards	
   one	
   another.	
   Things	
   continue	
   to	
  become	
   the	
   other,	
   while	
   continuing	
   to	
   be	
   what	
   they	
   are	
   …’	
   (2009:	
   99,	
  original	
  emphasis).	
  	
  Transformation,	
  becoming,	
  multiplicity	
  –	
  each	
  expresses	
  a	
  process	
  of	
  ‘becoming-­‐other’,	
   becoming-­‐minor	
   in	
   terms	
   of	
   ‘becoming-­‐child,	
   becoming-­‐animal,	
  becoming-­‐woman,	
   becoming-­‐black’	
   (2009:	
   99).	
   Krog	
   wants	
   to	
   take	
   up	
   the	
  opportunity	
  to	
  do	
  what	
  South	
  African	
  writer	
  Njabulo	
  Ndebele	
  had	
  called	
  for	
  –	
  to	
  move	
   away	
   from	
   the	
   ‘international	
   sanctity	
   of	
   the	
   white	
   body	
   and	
   share	
   the	
  vulnerability	
  of	
  the	
  black	
  body’	
  (2009:	
  100).	
  	
  	
   The	
   question	
   is	
   whether	
   the	
   ‘sanctity	
   of	
   whiteness’	
   or	
   its	
   philosophical	
  extensions	
   can	
   be	
   undone	
   at	
   the	
   level	
   of	
   the	
   ‘understanding’?	
   And	
   can	
   the	
  vulnerability	
  of	
  the	
  ‘black	
  body’	
  ever	
  be	
  understood?	
  Such	
  an	
  understanding,	
  if	
  it	
  were	
   possible,	
   would	
   be	
   very	
   distinct	
   from	
   living	
   that	
   vulnerability.	
   In	
   their	
  discussions	
   Patton	
   explains	
   to	
   Krog	
   that	
   what	
   she	
   seeks	
   might	
   be	
   achieved	
  through	
   the	
   capacities	
   of	
   an	
   affective	
   being.	
   	
   Krog	
   might	
   become	
   an	
   ‘inter-­‐individual	
  assembly	
  or	
  assemblage’	
  that	
  has	
  the	
  capacity	
  to	
  affect	
  and	
  be	
  affected	
  by	
  the	
  ‘other	
  side	
  of	
  the	
  pact’	
  (2009:	
  101)	
  Listening	
  to	
  stories	
  is	
  the	
  device	
  that	
  Krog	
  suggests	
  for	
  moving	
  towards	
  such	
  a	
  pact:	
  Stories	
  have	
  different	
  characters	
  and	
  threads	
  and	
  plots;	
  they	
  leave	
  space	
  for	
   variety.	
   Stories	
   are	
   boundary	
   crossings,	
  making	
   it	
   possible	
   to	
  move,	
  justifying	
   different	
   kinds	
   of	
   behaviour	
   and	
   also	
   behaviour	
   that	
   is	
   not	
  necessarily	
   justified	
   –	
   no	
   single	
   line	
   holds	
   things	
   together,	
   because	
   the	
  spaces	
  contain	
  contradictions	
  in	
  which	
  one	
  variety	
  is	
  as	
  valid	
  as	
  the	
  other	
  (2009:	
  101)	
  In	
  listening	
  to	
  stories	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  become	
  Krog	
  opens	
  a	
  liminal	
  space.	
  	
  Liminality	
  is	
  the	
  space	
  of	
  a	
  movement,	
  contact	
  with	
  an	
  outside,	
  un-­‐homing	
  and	
  re-­‐homing	
  at	
  the	
   same	
   time.	
   The	
   liminal	
   space	
   is	
   hazardous,	
   the	
   site	
   of	
   risk,	
   exposure	
   –	
   but	
  also	
   opening	
   the	
   possibility	
   of	
   sharing,	
   being-­‐with,	
   refusing	
   the	
   safety	
   of	
   clear	
  positions	
   and	
   certain	
   outcomes.	
   Stories,	
   the	
  mytho-­‐poetic,	
   seem	
   to	
   enable	
   this	
  liminality.	
  But	
  in	
  what	
  language	
  will	
  these	
  stories	
  be	
  heard	
  and	
  told?	
  	
  	
   Krog	
  reminds	
  us	
  of	
  those	
  powerful	
  words	
  from	
  Coetzee’s	
  Disgrace	
  where	
  David	
  Lurie	
  remarks	
  that	
  Petrus’s	
  story	
  cannot	
  be	
  told	
   in	
  English.	
   	
  Perhaps	
  the	
  deepest	
  opacity	
  of	
  the	
  South	
  African	
  condition	
  is	
  revealed	
  in	
  the	
  story	
  that	
  is	
  not	
  yet	
  told	
  –	
  Petrus’s	
  story.	
  	
  I	
  am	
  left	
  with	
  the	
  sense	
  in	
  reading	
  Krog’s	
  book	
  that	
  the	
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key	
  to	
  postcolonial	
  becoming	
  is	
  for	
  the	
  space	
  to	
  be	
  created	
  for	
  Petrus’s	
  story	
  to	
  be	
  told.	
  	
  Krog’s	
  book	
  is	
  dedicated	
  to	
  Petrus,	
  it	
  seems	
  to	
  be	
  oriented	
  towards	
  him	
  -­‐	
  but	
   it	
   is	
   still	
   about	
   Krog’s	
   becoming	
   rather	
   than	
   his.	
   This	
   is,	
   then,	
   the	
   most	
  opaque	
  of	
  liminal	
  moments,	
  a	
  vanishing	
  point	
  at	
  which	
  Krog’s	
  text	
  deconstructs	
  itself.	
  	
  Krog	
  does	
  not	
  have	
  the	
  language	
  to	
  tell	
  Petrus’s	
  story.	
  He	
  must	
  tell	
  it,	
  and	
  in	
   his	
   language.	
   And	
   then	
   the	
   difficulty	
   will	
   be	
   that	
   the	
   community	
   that	
   must	
  share	
   in	
   this	
   telling	
  will	
   be	
   circumscribed	
   by	
   the	
   politics	
   of	
   language	
   in	
   South	
  Africa.	
  How	
  will	
   stories	
   told	
  by	
  black	
  people	
  enable	
  access	
   to	
  becoming-­‐minor,	
  generate	
   the	
   affective	
   feelings	
   across	
   assemblages,	
   if	
   English	
   dominates	
   and	
  becomes	
   the	
  medium	
  for	
   truth	
   in	
  South	
  Africa?	
  Despite	
   these	
  distortions,	
  what	
  Krog	
   is	
  starting	
  to	
  hear	
   is	
   the	
  communal	
  ethics	
   that	
  guides	
  the	
  actions	
  of	
  black	
  South	
  Africans.	
  So	
  there	
  is	
  not	
  only	
  a	
  postcolonial	
  voice,	
  but	
  also	
  a	
  postcolonial	
  
listening	
  in	
  Krog’s	
  book.	
  I	
  will	
  return	
  below	
  to	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  ‘interconnectedness’	
  that	
   Krog	
   deploys	
   as	
   the	
   black	
   paradigm	
   or	
   framework	
   of	
   understanding	
   that	
  white	
   South	
   Africans	
   need	
   to	
   move	
   towards.	
   First	
   let’s	
   consider	
   the	
   telling	
   of	
  stories	
  in	
  another	
  register.	
  	
  	
   Towards	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  her	
  conversation	
  with	
  Patton	
  in	
  Berlin	
  Krog	
  is	
  asked	
  whether	
  she	
  is	
  writing	
  a	
  novel.	
   	
  She	
  insists	
  that	
  she	
  is	
  not.	
  Why	
  so,	
  Patton	
  asks,	
  when	
  she	
  could	
  explore	
  the	
  inner	
  psyche	
  of	
  characters	
  -­‐	
  imagine	
  being	
  black,	
  for	
  instance?	
  Krog	
  responds	
  that	
  she	
  does	
  not	
  want	
  to	
  give	
  up	
  on	
  the	
   ‘strangeness’	
  that	
  can	
  be	
  preserved	
  in	
  non-­‐fiction.	
  It	
  is	
  a	
  strangeness	
  that	
  is	
  not	
  invented:	
  ‘the	
  strangeness	
   is	
   real,	
   and	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
   I	
   cannot	
   ever	
   really	
   enter	
   the	
   psyche	
   of	
  somebody	
   else,	
   somebody	
   black.	
   The	
   terror	
   and	
   loneliness	
   of	
   that	
   inability	
   is	
  what	
   I	
   don’t	
  want	
   to	
   give	
   up	
   on’	
   (2009:	
   267).	
   She	
   goes	
   onto	
   state	
   that	
   at	
   this	
  stage,	
   for	
   her,	
   ‘imagination	
   is	
   overrated’	
   (2009:	
   268)	
   Krog	
   then	
   says	
   that	
   ‘to	
  imagine	
  black	
  at	
  this	
  stage	
  is	
  to	
  insult	
  black.	
  That	
  is	
  why	
  I	
  stay	
  with	
  non-­‐fiction,	
  listening,	
  engaging,	
  observing,	
  translating,	
  until	
  one	
  can	
  begin	
  to	
  sense	
  a	
  thinning	
  of	
  skin,	
  negotiate	
  possible	
  small	
  openings	
  at	
  places	
  where	
  imaginings	
  can	
  begin	
  to	
  begin’	
  (2009:	
  268).	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   In	
   exploring	
   the	
   interconnectedness	
   that	
   underpins	
   the	
   actions	
   of	
   black	
  people	
  in	
  Southern	
  Africa,	
  Krog	
  dismisses	
  the	
  suggestion	
  that	
  this	
  is	
  also	
  present	
  in	
  many	
  western	
  philosophies.	
   	
  There	
   is	
   an	
  exceptionalism	
   in	
  her	
   treatment	
  of	
  Bantu	
  philosophy	
  –	
  and	
  she	
  has	
  no	
  truck	
  with	
  Patton’s	
  suggestion	
  that	
  Spinoza,	
  Feuerbach,	
   Levinas,	
   Freud,	
   and	
   indeed	
   Jewish,	
   and	
   many	
   other	
   cultures,	
   are	
  characterized	
  by	
  this	
  interconnectedness	
  (2009:	
  155-­‐6).	
  	
  But	
  there	
  is	
  also	
  merit	
  in	
   eschewing	
   the	
   sense	
   that	
   Europe	
   has	
   always	
   already	
   thought	
   it	
  (interconnectedness,	
  and	
  everything	
  else),	
  and	
  can	
  encompass	
  everything	
  within	
  its	
   philosophical	
   frameworks.	
   Instead	
   Krog	
   sees	
   the	
   interconnectedness	
   at	
   the	
  heart	
   of	
   black	
   leaders	
   like	
   Mandela	
   or	
   Tutu	
   as	
   one	
   inherited	
   from	
   the	
   First	
  Peoples	
  of	
  Southern	
  Africa,	
  the	
  San	
  and	
  Khoi	
  (2009:	
  184).	
  	
   Krog’s	
  objective	
  is	
  to	
  draw	
  on	
  the	
  onto-­‐epistemes	
  of	
  Bantu,	
  and	
  Western	
  philosophies,	
   as	
   well	
   as	
   oral	
   and	
   literary	
   traditions.	
   	
   Rejecting	
   the	
   option	
   of	
  ‘white	
   flight’	
   –	
   the	
   ‘take	
   the	
   money	
   and	
   run’	
   attitude	
   that	
   some	
   white	
   South	
  Africans	
  have	
  adopted	
  -­‐	
  she	
  has	
  used	
  the	
  genre	
  of	
  literary	
  non-­‐fiction	
  to	
  pose	
  and	
  respond	
   to	
   the	
   question	
   of	
   what	
   it	
   would	
   mean	
   for	
   white	
   South	
   Africans	
   to	
  undergo	
   epistemic	
   and	
   ontological	
   decolonization	
   as	
   a	
   condition	
   of	
   being-­‐
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becoming	
   other-­‐wise.	
   In	
   a	
   philosophical	
   register,	
   her	
   inquiry	
   is	
   into	
   ways	
   of	
  constituting	
  a	
  decolonizing	
   ‘sense	
  of	
  being’.	
  The	
  verb	
   ‘decolonizing’	
  rather	
  than	
  ‘decolonized’	
   is	
   significant	
  here.	
   It	
   accords	
  with	
   the	
  verbal	
   character	
  of	
  ubuntu	
  which	
  operates	
   as	
   a	
  gerund,	
   a	
  noun	
   that	
   functions	
  as	
   a	
   verb	
   (see	
  discussion	
  of	
  Magobe	
  Ramose’s	
  philosophy	
  of	
  ubuntu	
  below).	
   	
   ‘Decolonizing’	
  also	
  signals	
   the	
  ongoing,	
  and	
  possibly	
  endless	
  task	
  of	
  undoing	
  colonial	
  legacies.	
  	
  	
  It	
   is	
  at	
   this	
   juncture	
  that	
   it	
   is	
  useful	
  to	
  read	
  Ramose’s	
  account	
  of	
  ubuntu	
  against	
   his	
   anticolonial	
   longing	
   for	
   a	
   recovered	
   sovereignty.	
   	
   It	
   is	
   clear	
   from	
  Ramose’s	
   account	
   of	
   ubuntu	
   that	
   ‘wholeness’	
   of	
   society	
   should	
   not	
   be	
   read	
   as	
  stasis	
  or	
  fixity.8	
  	
  If	
  anything	
  what	
  is	
  clear	
  about	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  be-­‐ing	
  in	
  ubuntu,	
  is	
  that	
  ‘Ubu-­‐’	
  is	
  ‘marked	
  by	
  uncertainty’	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  ‘by	
  definition	
  motion	
  involving	
  the	
   possibility	
   of	
   infinite	
   unfoldment	
   and	
   concrete	
   manifestation	
   into	
   a	
  multiplicity	
   of	
   forms	
   and	
   organisms’	
   (Ramose,	
   2002,	
   50).	
   This	
   resonates	
   quite	
  strongly	
   with	
   Deleuzian	
   accounts	
   of	
   being	
   as	
   an	
   ‘inter-­‐individual	
   assemblage’.	
  ‘Ubu-­‐’	
  expresses	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  ‘be-­‐ing	
  in	
  general’,	
  the	
  widest	
  generality	
  of	
  be-­‐ing	
  (Ramose,	
  2002,	
  41).	
  ‘Umu-­‐’	
  shares	
  a	
  similar	
  ontology,	
  but	
  is	
  more	
  specific.	
  	
  ‘Umu-­‐’,	
   joined	
   with	
   ‘-­‐ntu’,	
   umuntu,	
   marks	
   the	
   emergence	
   of	
   homo	
   loquens	
   and	
   in	
  ‘common	
  parlance	
  means	
  the	
  human	
  be-­‐ing:	
  the	
  marker	
  of	
  politics	
  religion	
  and	
  law’	
   (2002:	
   41).	
   The	
   inquiry	
   into	
   being,	
   experience,	
   knowledge	
   and	
   truth	
   is	
  conducted	
  by	
  umuntu	
  –	
  but	
  this	
  is	
   ‘an	
  ongoing	
  process’,	
  an	
  ‘activity	
  rather	
  than	
  an	
  act’	
  (2002:	
  41).	
  Hence	
   ‘ubu-­‐’	
   is	
  regarded	
  as	
   ‘be-­‐ing	
  becoming’	
  (2002:	
  41).	
   	
   It	
  implies	
  a	
  notion	
  of	
  be-­‐ing	
  as	
   incessant	
  motion	
  (2002:	
  41).	
  Umu-­‐ntu/ubu-­‐ntu	
   in	
  incessant	
  motion	
  can	
  then	
  be	
  expressed	
  with	
  the	
  emphasis	
  on	
  the	
  ‘verbal’	
  rather	
  than	
   the	
   verb	
   ‘–ntu’.	
   	
   Ubuntu	
   is	
   then	
   a	
   ‘verbal	
   noun’	
   –	
   that	
   is	
   to	
   say,	
   in	
  grammatical	
   terms,	
   it	
   is	
   a	
   ‘gerund’	
   (‘a	
   form	
  of	
   verb	
   functioning	
  as	
   a	
  noun’	
   –	
   in	
  English	
   ending	
   in	
   -­ing	
   and	
  used	
  with	
   a	
   verb	
   -­‐	
  OED)	
   (2002:	
  41-­‐2,	
   82).	
   This	
   is	
   a	
  disruption	
  of	
  the	
  regular	
  western	
  opposition	
  between	
  being	
  and	
  becoming.	
  	
  ‘Be-­‐ing	
   becoming’	
   places	
   the	
   emphasis	
   on	
   motion,	
   and	
   is	
   thus	
   against	
   the	
  fragmentation	
  of	
   being	
   (2002:	
  42-­‐3).	
  The	
   association	
  of	
   ‘being’	
  with	
  order	
   and	
  ‘becoming’	
  with	
   chaos	
   is	
   broken	
  by	
   the	
   ‘flow’	
   (the	
  Greek	
   verb,	
   rheo)	
   of	
   ‘be-­‐ing	
  becoming’.	
   The	
   general	
   view	
   is	
   that	
   the	
   ‘apparent	
   structure	
   of	
   language	
  determines	
  the	
  sequence	
  of	
  thought’	
  (2002:	
  43).	
  As	
  language	
  breaks	
  the	
  silence	
  of	
  be-­‐ing,	
   ‘be-­‐ing	
  becoming’	
  must	
  be	
  understood	
  in	
  and	
  through	
  the	
  ‘rheomode’	
  language	
   (2002:	
   45).	
   This	
   has	
   implications	
   for	
   how	
   the	
   legal	
   subject	
   is	
  conceptualised,	
  and	
  can	
  be	
  explained	
  at	
  that	
  more	
  concrete	
  level.	
  	
  	
   The	
   logic	
  of	
  ubu-­‐ntu	
   follows	
   that	
  of	
   a	
   rheomode	
   language.	
   	
  A	
   rheomode	
  language	
  places	
  emphasis	
  on	
   the	
  gerund,	
   and	
  opposes	
   the	
   ‘subject-­‐verb-­‐object’	
  linguistic	
   structure	
   (2002:	
   46).	
   Of	
   course	
   this	
   linguistic	
   structure	
   which	
  privileges	
   the	
   name/noun	
   as	
   the	
   acting	
   moving	
   subject	
   has	
   been	
   undone	
   by	
  many	
  philosophers,	
  including	
  by	
  Jacques	
  Derrida	
  in	
  his	
  work	
  on	
  the	
  ‘trace’	
  which	
  marks	
   and	
   exceeds	
   the	
   appearance	
   of	
   all	
   signification,	
   as	
   well	
   as	
   in	
   his	
  deconstruction	
  of	
  the	
  metaphysics	
  of	
  ‘presence’.	
  	
  These	
  insights	
  are	
  incorporated	
  by	
  Ramose	
  (2002:	
  101).	
  The	
   ‘subject-­‐verb-­‐object’	
  structure	
  asserts	
  an	
  ontology	
  where	
  subject/object	
  are	
  distinct	
  entities	
  and	
  the	
  verb	
  acts	
  as	
  mediator.	
   It	
   is	
   in	
  this	
  way	
  that	
  what	
  Ramose	
  terms	
  the	
  ‘fragmentation	
  of	
  be-­‐ing’	
  takes	
  place.	
  	
  It	
  is	
  through	
   this	
   ontological	
   structure	
   that	
   western	
   legal	
   thought	
   attributes	
   rights	
  and	
  duties	
  to	
  the	
  ‘nounized	
  legal	
  subject’	
  (2002:	
  82).	
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   The	
  whole-­‐ness	
   that	
   the	
   philosophy	
   of	
   ubuntu	
   is	
   supposed	
   to	
   inspire	
   is	
  thus	
  not	
  the	
  absolute	
  of	
  community-­‐as-­‐law	
  or	
  communitarianism.	
  Rather	
  whole-­‐ness	
   through	
   ubuntu	
   is	
   the	
   recognition	
   that	
   be-­‐ing	
   is	
   not	
   fragmented	
   as	
   the	
  subject/noun	
   ‘be!’	
   as	
   it	
   is	
   in	
   (some)	
  western	
   ontologies	
   (2002:	
   46-­‐7).	
   	
   African	
  law:	
   is	
   law	
   without	
   a	
   centre	
   since	
   the	
   legal	
   subject	
   here	
   is	
   an	
   active	
   but	
  transient	
   participant	
   in	
   the	
   be-­‐ing,	
   that	
   is,	
   the	
   musical	
   flow	
   of	
   law	
   …	
   .	
  
Ubuntu	
   law	
   is	
   not	
   only	
   the	
   ontology	
   of	
   the	
   do-­‐ing	
   subject.	
   	
   It	
   is	
  contemporaneously	
   the	
   epistemology	
   of	
   the	
   dicern-­‐ing	
   subject	
  continuously	
  harmonising	
  the	
  music	
  of	
  the	
  universe.	
  In	
  this	
  sense,	
  ubuntu	
  philosophy	
  of	
  law	
  is	
  a	
  dynamology.	
  Law	
  here	
  is	
  thus	
  dynamic	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  place	
  rheomodic	
  (2002:	
  92).	
  The	
  subject	
  is	
  then	
  not	
  obliged	
  to	
  live	
  ‘within	
  the	
  law’	
  as	
  with	
  the	
  western	
  legal	
  subject,	
  but	
  to	
  ‘live	
  the	
  law’	
  (2002:	
  93).	
  The	
  object	
  of	
  law	
  inspired	
  by	
  ubuntu	
  is	
  to	
  maintain	
  equilibrium	
  (2002:	
  93-­‐4).	
  	
  	
   Ubuntu	
   thus	
   provides	
   a	
   mode	
   of	
   becoming	
   otherwise	
   that	
   will	
   not	
  guarantee	
  individual	
  freedoms	
  at	
  all	
  times	
  as	
  some	
  western	
  liberal	
  philosophers	
  demand.	
   	
   According	
   to	
   Krog	
   ubuntu	
   promotes	
   a	
   mode	
   of	
   interconnectedness	
  which	
  is	
  at	
  the	
  heart	
  of	
  the	
  great	
  deeds	
  of	
  men	
  like	
  Mandela	
  and	
  Tutu.	
  	
  But	
  it	
  also	
  goes	
   wrong	
   when	
   the	
   interconnectedness	
   is	
   conflated	
   with	
   race	
   –	
   when	
  identifying	
  with	
  being	
  black	
  and	
  against	
  the	
   ‘west’	
   leads	
  to	
  defining	
  community	
  without	
   interrogating	
  what	
   this	
   community	
   is	
  or	
   should	
  be.	
  Krog	
  suggests	
   that	
  this	
  explains	
  the	
  mistaken	
  support	
  for	
  Mugabe	
  –	
  a	
  sense	
  of	
  black	
  community	
  and	
  interconnectedness	
   that	
   has	
   gone	
  wrong.	
   She	
   contrasts	
   this	
  with	
  Mandela	
   and	
  Tutu	
  who	
  always	
  use	
  interconnectedness	
  to	
  redefine	
  their	
  religious	
  and	
  political	
  communities	
  (Krog,	
  2009,	
  236-­‐37).	
  	
  	
  	
   *	
  	
  	
   The	
  history	
  and	
  politics	
  that	
  conditions	
  living	
  beside	
  and	
  with	
  Petrus	
  is	
  at	
  the	
  heart	
  of	
  Begging	
   to	
  be	
  Black.	
   	
   Indeed	
   the	
  book	
   is	
  dedicated	
   to	
  Petrus	
  –	
   the	
  character	
   in	
   J.M.	
   Coetzee’s	
   Disgrace.	
   Here	
   the	
   fictive	
   inaugurates	
   an	
   ethical	
  moment	
  and	
  political	
   event.	
  Begging	
   to	
  be	
  Black	
   is	
  not	
  a	
  work	
  of	
   fiction.	
   	
  Krog	
  insists	
  that	
  she	
  will	
  not	
  write	
  fiction.	
   	
  Instead,	
  literary	
  imagination,	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  worlds,	
   listening	
  to	
  stories,	
   is	
   folded	
  into	
  history,	
  philosophy,	
   transformative	
  politics	
   and	
   the	
   juridical	
   order.	
   	
  Krog	
   thus	
   inaugurates	
   a	
  critical	
   event	
   through	
  her	
  book.	
  It	
  is	
  an	
  inauguration	
  (an	
  event)	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  at	
  once	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  a	
  world	
   in	
   text	
   –	
   but	
   also	
   the	
   recovery	
   of	
   19th	
   century	
   colonial	
   history,	
   and	
   an	
  engagement	
   with	
   the	
   pressing	
   social	
   and	
   political	
   problems	
   of	
   the	
   present.	
  
Begging	
   to	
  be	
  Black	
   is	
  a	
   critical	
  event	
   in	
   that	
   it	
   responds	
   to	
  a	
   crisis	
  of	
   identity,	
  belonging,	
  violence,	
  home,	
  and	
  colonial	
  epistemicide.	
  True	
  to	
  the	
  double	
  demand	
  of	
  critique	
  it	
  identifies	
  the	
  crisis	
  or	
  limit,	
  and	
  suggests	
  a	
  restorative	
  way	
  forward.	
  	
  Being-­‐critical,	
   being–with,	
   restoring	
   a	
   sense	
   of	
   the	
   world	
   –	
   Krog	
   shows	
   how	
  these	
  are	
  not	
  only	
  post-­‐Heideggerian	
  attitudes	
  to	
  philosophy	
  and	
  politics.	
  They	
  are	
   the	
   urgent	
   demands	
   of	
   decolonization	
   –	
   and	
   Krog	
   finds	
   the	
   resources	
   in	
  Western	
   and	
   Bantu	
   philosophy	
   for	
   addressing	
   them.	
   Through	
   this	
   work	
   of	
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literary	
   history	
   a	
   newness	
   enters	
   the	
   world.	
   It	
   is	
   a	
   newness	
   always	
   already	
  conditioned	
  by	
  a	
  colonial	
  history.	
  Becoming	
  black	
  might	
  be	
  the	
  as	
  if	
   	
  that	
  opens	
  and	
  sustains	
  a	
  new	
  political	
  dispensation	
  in	
  post-­‐apartheid	
  South	
  Africa.	
  	
   The	
   space	
   of	
   postcolonial	
   becoming	
   opened	
   by	
   Krog	
   is	
   a	
   liminal	
   space.	
  
Liminality	
  is	
  the	
  space	
  of	
  a	
  traversal,	
  a	
  point	
  of	
  contact	
  between	
  past	
  and	
  future.	
  Liminality	
  works	
  more	
  subtly	
  and	
  does	
  not	
  carry	
   the	
   temporal	
  weight	
  of	
   ‘post’	
  (in	
   postcolonial	
   or	
   post-­‐Apartheid).	
   	
   Liminality	
   invokes	
   a	
   fragility.	
   It	
   refers	
   to	
  beings,	
  bodies,	
  or	
  events	
  that	
  are	
  the	
  site	
  of	
  exposure	
  to	
  a	
  new	
  accommodation	
  that	
  eschews	
  a	
  sovereign	
  mode	
  of	
  being.	
  Liminality	
  is	
  opaque.	
  Liminality	
  is	
  thus	
  quite	
  centrally	
  tied	
  to	
  the	
  task	
  of	
  critique.	
  Postcolonial	
  becoming	
  through	
  liminal	
  beings	
  is	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  important	
  sites	
  where	
  the	
  work	
  of	
  critique	
  takes	
  place.	
  The	
  ‘vanishing	
   point’	
   is	
   another	
   way	
   of	
   expressing	
   the	
   liminal,	
   the	
   threshold	
  momentarily	
   occupied	
   by	
   a	
   new	
   subjectivity	
   in	
   the	
   face	
   of	
   a	
   crisis	
   of	
   law	
   and	
  society.	
  The	
  liminal	
  subject	
  of	
  critique	
  opens	
  a	
  new	
  accommodation,	
  refusing	
  the	
  state	
   and	
   its	
   rights,	
   and	
   thus	
  disassociating	
   sovereignty	
   from	
  a	
  new	
  ethics	
   and	
  politics.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  ENDNOTES	
  1	
  See	
  Homi	
  K.	
  Bhabha’s	
  Forward	
  to	
  The	
  Wretched	
  of	
  the	
  Earth	
  for	
  an	
  evocative	
  discussion	
  of	
  this	
  opacity,	
  p.	
  xli.	
  2	
  This	
  move	
  away	
  from	
  ‘anticolonial	
  longing’	
  is	
  influenced	
  by	
  Scott	
  (2004:	
  7).	
  	
  3	
  See	
  Madlingozi	
  (2007)	
  for	
  a	
  critique	
  of	
  the	
  terms	
  of	
  transition,	
  and	
  a	
  problematisation	
  of	
  the	
  ‘new’	
  in	
  post-­‐apartheid	
  discourse.	
  4	
  For	
  an	
  excellent	
  history	
  of	
  colonial	
  expropriation	
  in	
  South	
  Africa,	
  see	
  Terreblanche	
  (2003).	
  5	
  See	
  Jacques	
  Derrida’s	
  discussion	
  of	
  Chris	
  Hani’s	
  assassination	
  in	
  his	
  lecture	
  ‘Whither	
  Marxism?’,	
  later	
  published	
  as	
  Spectres	
  of	
  Marx	
  (1994)	
  –	
  a	
  book	
  dedicated	
  to	
  Chris	
  Hani.	
  6	
  On	
  the	
  30th	
  of	
  September,	
  2010	
  the	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  of	
  South	
  Africa	
  will	
  hear	
  the	
  appeal	
  in	
  The	
  Citizen	
  (1978)	
  (Pty)	
  Ltd	
  and	
  Others	
  v	
  McBride	
  (CCT23/10)	
  concerning	
  whether	
  a	
  newspaper’s	
  reference	
  to	
  a	
  person	
  as	
  a	
  ‘murderer’	
  after	
  he	
  was	
  granted	
  amnesty	
  by	
  the	
  TRC	
  constitutes	
  defamation.	
  Does	
  the	
  recognition	
  of	
  the	
  ‘political’	
  nature	
  of	
  a	
  killing	
  mean	
  that	
  it	
  ceases	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  ‘murder’?	
  Can	
  newspapers	
  or	
  relatives	
  of	
  the	
  victim	
  refer	
  to	
  the	
  perpetrator	
  as	
  a	
  murderer?	
  	
  7	
  (1996)	
  CCT	
  17/96.	
  8	
  See	
  Drucilla	
  Cornell,	
  ‘The	
  Significance	
  of	
  the	
  Living	
  Customary	
  Law	
  For	
  an	
  Understanding	
  of	
  Law:	
  Does	
  Custom	
  Allow	
  for	
  a	
  Woman	
  to	
  be	
  Chief’	
  (unpublished,	
  copy	
  with	
  author).	
  Here	
  Cornell	
  discusses	
  the	
  recent	
  case	
  of	
  
Shilubana	
  v	
  Nwamitwa	
  (CCT	
  03/07)	
  [2008]	
  ZACC	
  9;	
  2008	
  (9)	
  BCLR	
  914	
  (CC);	
  2009	
  2	
  SA	
  66	
  (CC)	
  concerning	
  the	
  manner	
  in	
  which	
  custom	
  and	
  customary	
  law	
  develops	
  over	
  time,	
  and	
  the	
  distinction	
  between	
  that	
  and	
  changes	
  in	
  the	
  common	
  law.	
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